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Contracts Jurisprudence and Article Nine
of the Uniform Commercial Code: The
Allowable Scope of Future Advance
and All Obligations Clauses in
Commercial Security Agreements
By BRUCE A. CAMPBELL*
Many commercial security agreements under Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code' provide that payment or performance of all
the debtor's obligations to the creditor is secured.2 Such agreements pur-
port to secure not only the debtor's primary obligation 3 to repay the
creditor's first advance, but in addition all of the debtor's secondary obli-
gations 4 to the creditor, including, among others, the obligation to repay
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., 1964,
DePauw University; M.A., 1966, Ph.D., 1973, Michigan State University; J.D., 1973, Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School.
1. This Article is confined principally to commercial security agreements under Article
Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -507 (1978) [hereinafter cited to
the 1978 version of the U.C.C. unless otherwise noted]. This Article does not discuss, except
incidentally, security agreements in which the debtor is a consumer. The law of real estate
mortgages is sometimes discussed as the source of principles applicable to Article Nine, but the
principal focus is on security interests in personal property.
2. The literature on future advance and all obligations clauses in security agreements
under Article Nine is scattered and varies in coverage and quality. The principal work on
security interests in personal property is G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY (1965). For more recent discussions of future advance and all obligations clauses
under Article Nine, see R. HILLMAN, J. MCDONNELL & S. NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND
EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 21.01 (1985) [hereinafter cited as R.
HILLMAN]; Justice, Secured Transactions-What Floats Can Be Sunk, 24 VILL. L. REV. 867
(1979).
3. A primary obligation is the obligation or obligations in connection with which the
security agreement is originally executed. The primary obligation is usually the debtor's obli-
gation to repay the first loan or extension of credit, and is usually specifically identified in the
security agreement.
4. A secondary obligation is any secured obligation which is not a primary obligation.
A secondary obligation arises separately from the execution of the original security agreement
and the incurrence of the primary obligation. A secondary obligation may be an antecedent
debt or may arise after the execution of the original security agreement.
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any future advances5 which the creditor may make.
The commercial utility and validity of future advance security ar-
rangements have long been recognized in real and personal property
law. Consolidating almost a century of development, the New York
Court of Appeals stated in 1881:
There is no question as to the validity of mortgages to secure future
advances or liabilities. They have become a recognized form of secur-
ity. Their frequent use has grown out of the necessities of trade, and
their convenience in the transactions of business. They enable parties
to provide for continuous dealings, the nature or extent of which may
not be known or anticipated at the time, and they avoid the expense
and inconvenience of executing a new security, on each transaction. It
is well known that such mortgages are constantly taken by banks, and
bankers, as security for final balances, and banking facilities are ex-
tended, and daily credits given, in reliance upon them.
6
Although today's financial institutions are much different from
those of the nineteenth century, the commercial utility of future advance
security arrangements remains constant. From the creditor's perspec-
tive, a future advance arrangement ordinarily allows additional loans or
credit to be extended only at the creditor's option, and provides that any
advance made will be secured under the original agreement. An all obli-
gations clause is intended to go even further to place the whole continu-
ing debtor-creditor relationship on a secured basis. From the standpoint
of the debtor, a comprehensive security arrangement may be the sine qua
non of receiving loans or credit, and may liberalize interest or repayment
terms. The future advance component allows the debtor to receive loans
or credit only as needed, thus delaying the incurrence of interest.
Difficult problems can arise when a creditor claims that a secondary
obligation which differs in some respect from the specific primary obliga-
tion is secured under a broad future advance or all obligations clause in
the original security agreement. For example, a bank enters into an
5. The Code defines neither "advance" nor "future advance." For the purposes of this
Article, an "advance" is any extension of value by the creditor to or primarily for the benefit of
the debtor, and a "future advance" is any such extension of value which is made after and
which is functionally separate from the execution of the original security agreement. A future
advance will usually be a secondary obligation. If the owner of the collateral is not the princi-
pal debtor, but functionally a surety to the extent of the collateral, an "advance" is an exten-
sion of value by the creditor to or primarily for the benefit of the principal debtor. These
definitions should apply to the terms "advance" and "future advance" when used in Article
Nine. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-204(3), -301(4), -307(3), -314(3). Most commentators and cases,
and even the Code itself, do not distinguish adequately between future advance and all obliga-
tions clauses. The all obligations clause may cover all forms of secondary obligations, includ-
ing both antecedent debts and the obligation to repay future advances. This Article maintains
the distinction by referring to both future advance and all obligations clauses.
6. Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N.Y. 43, 47 (1881).
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agreement with a car dealership by which the bank regularly extends
credit against new car invoices and certificates of manufacture. The orig-
inal security agreement provides that a security interest in the dealer-
ship's inventory will secure all obligations of the dealer to the bank.
When the dealership encounters financial difficulties, the bank allows the
dealer to make substantial overdrafts in his checking account, and then
claims that the dealer's secondary obligation-to repay the overdrafts-
is secured under the original security agreement's all obligations clause.
7
Such a claim raises four fundamental questions: 1) Intention: Did the
parties intend that the original agreement would secure the secondary
obligation? 2) Validity: If so, is the securing of the secondary obligation
legally permissible under Article Nine? 3) Good Faith: Has the secured
creditor acted in good faith? 4) Priority: If the obligation is within the
allowable scope8 of the security agreement and the creditor has acted in
good faith, what is the extent of the secured creditor's priority for the
interest securing the obligation vis-a-vis competing claimants to the
debtor's collateral?
Unfortunately, most cases addressing the problem of the allowable
scope of a future advance or all obligations clause are an analytic waste-
land. Opinions fail to distinguish issues of contractual interpretation (in-
tent) from those of validity and policing creditor behavior, fail to reason
persuasively, and are divided in rationale and results. In the absence of
special circumstances, such as language in the security agreement pre-
cisely identifying the category of secondary obligation in question as se-
cured, many courts, influenced by the late Professor Grant Gilmore,9
apply the following rule of construction to determine the allowable scope
of the agreement: the only secondary obligations intended by the parties
to be secured are those of the same class as the primary obligation and so
related to it that the consent of the debtor to its inclusion as a secured
obligation may be inferred.10 Some courts applying this "same class-re-
latedness" rule of construction find that almost any difference between
the primary and secondary obligations places the secondary obligation in
a different class, with the result that the parties are held not to have
7. This example is suggested by Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 566 P.2d 470
(1977).
8. The "allowable scope" of a future advance or all obligations clause refers to both
intention and validity. The intended scope of the security agreement is technically a question
of fact. The validity of what the parties originally intended is a question of law.
9. See R. HILLMAN, supra note 2, §§ 35.2, .5.
10. E.g., National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959), afl'd
sub nom. National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960) (pre-Code law).
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intended to secure the secondary obligation.'I Other courts find the
"same class-relatedness" test to be met despite differences between the
primary and secondary obligations.1 2
At the other end of the spectrum, many courts apply no rule of
construction but simply hold, often without much analysis, that the par-
ties intended what the language in their written agreement would gener-
ally be taken to express.13 If a written security agreement provided that
all obligations of the debtor to the creditor would be secured, such a
court would ordinarily hold that a secondary obligation was intended to
be secured without inquiry as to whether the subsequent obligation was
of the same class as or related to the original. Along the same lines,
when the language of a future advance or all obligations clause appears
unambiguous on its face, some courts will apply the plain meaning rule, 14
excluding evidence of the subjective intent of either party which conflicts
with the plain meaning of the clause.1 5 Although the exclusion of evi-
dence of subjective intent does not necessarily preclude the application of
the "same class-relatedness" rule of construction, a restrictive ruling on
the parol evidence question usually presages the enforcement of the plain
meaning of the all obligations clause. Finally, the legislature of the State
of Tennessee, apparently exasperated with a line of cases by the local
bankruptcy courts applying the "same class-relatedness" rule to restrict
priority claims of secured creditors, 16 passed a remarkable statute provid-
ing that any written, signed security instrument containing a future ad-
vance or all obligations clause "shall be deemed to evidence the true
intentions of the parties, and shall be enforced as written . . . regardless
of the class of the other indebtedness, be it unsecured, commercial, credit
11. E.g., Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 666, 566 P.2d 470, 482 (1977); Heath
Tecna Corp. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 609 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Utah 1980); John Miller Supply
Co. v. Western State Bank, 55 Wis. 2d 385, 394, 199 N.W.2d 161, 165 (1972).
12. E.g., Marine Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dentsply Professional Plan, 617 P.2d 1340,
1346 (Okla. 1980).
13. E.g., In re Public Leasing Corp., 488 F.2d 1369, 1377-78 (10th Cir. 1973); In re
Iredale's Ltd., 476 F.2d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Riss Tanning Corp., 468 F.2d 1211,
1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
14. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932) (plain meaning rule); cf RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 201(2), (3), 203(3), 212, § 212 comment b (1981).
15. E.g., Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 495-96 (5th Cir.
1977), afJ'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715
(1979); see also First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 676 P.2d
837, 841-42 (Okla. 1984).
16. E.g., In re Blair, 26 Bankr. 228, 229-30 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982) (secondary busi-
ness obligations not of the same class and unrelated to primary personal obligations); In re
Johnson, 9 Bankr. 713, 716-17 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981) (lender made no showing that sec-
ond loan was in same class as first).
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card, or consumer indebtedness."
17
What the cases lack and what the commentators have failed to pro-
vide is an adequate theoretical framework for resolving the interpretive
and policing issues raised by broad future advance and all obligations
clauses under Article Nine. Such a framework must have three elements.
The first is a working theory of the obligational side of secured transac-
tions, a theory, that is, of the general validity, under Article Nine, of
agreements securing various types of obligations. The second element is
a working theory of contract interpretation adapted to the specific con-
text of Article Nine. The final element is a set of standards derived from
Code and non-Code sources for policing secured creditors' overreaching
or other abuses.
This Article begins to construct such a framework. Part I discusses
the Article Nine revolution. Replacing a functionally restrictive pre-
Code system, Article Nine was intended to encourage the extension of
credit to small businesses on a secured basis in the belief that additional
credit would spur economic growth and that the overall benefits of the
new system would exceed the costs. Part II discusses Article Nine's par-
tial conceptualization of a security agreement as a contract, and its initial
validation of future advance and all obligations clauses. Part III further
discusses the security agreement as a modem contract. In the absence of
special circumstances, most commercial security agreements are both re-
lational and adhesive contracts and should be approached with doctrinal
tools suitable for working with these modem phenomena. In general,
Part III proposes that the intended scope of such a security agreement
can be found in the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties as
to the scope of their ongoing debtor-creditor relationship. Part IV dis-
cusses mechanisms for identifying and redressing secured creditor abuses
of future advance and all obligations clauses. The section proposes that
secured creditor behavior be regulated principally through the require-
ment that creditors perform and enforce their security agreements in
good faith, defined broadly to include not merely faithfulness to common
purposes and justifiable expectations, but also compliance with commu-
nity standards of decency, fairness, and justice. In addition, a specific
clause within a detailed list of secured obligations in the original printed-
form security agreement may be denied enforcement because it is uncon-
scionable. Part V argues that the "same class-relatedness" rule is inap-
propriate under Article Nine for several reasons: it is indeterminate in
content; it is, as a rule of strict construction, inconsistent with the pur-
17. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-112(b) (1984).
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poses and language of the Uniform Commercial Code; it leads to unfor-
tunate counter-measures; and it is not warranted by pre-Code law. Part
VI applies the general interpretive and policing standards developed in
Parts II-IV to some test cases. Part VII is a summary conclusion.
This Article makes two assumptions. First, the Article assumes that
Article Nine grants the secured creditor substantial priority for interests
securing secondary obligations over rival interests in the same collat-
eral.' Second, the Article assumes that federal bankruptcy law' 9 for the
most part respects the asset distribution scheme of Article Nine.20 Dis-
cussion of the priority under Article Nine of interests securing secondary
obligations and of the survivability of such priority interests in bank-
ruptcy are left for another day.
The Article Nine Revolution: A New Systemic Norm
The New Systemic Norm: Encouraging Secured Credit
by Favoring Secured Creditors
An understanding of Article Nine begins with a knowledge of the
contours of pre-Code personal property security law. 2' The early mod-
ern common law was hostile to nonpossessory chattel security, which it
tended to regard as a fraudulent device to lure the debtor's third-party
creditors into improvident extensions of credit. Beginning in the early
nineteenth century, the law gradually responded to economic pressures
created by the accelerating industrial revolution, as legislatures and
courts moved fitfully to accommodate an ever wider variety of nonpos-
sessory commercial security devices. The process of legal change was not
yet complete during the immediate post-World War II period. The law
of chattel security was a numbingly complex mixture of common law and
statutory provisions defining and limiting chattel mortgages, conditional
sales, trust receipts, factor's liens, assignments of accounts receivable,
and other devices.
18. U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to -308.
19. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-109 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
20. See generally Jackson, Avoiding Power in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725 (1984);
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J.
857 (1982). The assumption stated in the text is open to question. See, e.g., White, The Recent
Erosion of the Secured Creditor's Rights Through Cases, Rules and Statutory Changes in Bank-
ruptcy Law, 53 Miss. L.J. 389 (1983). The most serious erosion of the secured creditor's Arti-
cle Nine rights appears to be in the context of Chapter 11 business reorganization proceedings.
Axe, Penetrating the Iron Curtain: Representing Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Reorganiza-
tion Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 421, 424 (1984).
21. This paragraph is derived from 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1.1-9.2.
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The pre-Code system of secured credit had a certain operational bal-
ance, with both negative and positive aspects.22 On the one hand, the
availability of secured credit, and perhaps of credit generally, to small
businesses was effectively restricted.23 Because of the costs, complexities,
and risks involved, commercial finance companies and a few large banks
were the only large-scale lenders which would extend credit on the basis
of collateralized inventory and accounts receivable.24 Many banks sim-
ply did not engage in asset-based financing at all.25 To acquire valid,
enforceable liens against all of the debtor's present and future assets was
technically possible in many and perhaps most jurisdictions, but it was so
difficult to do that "only the most expert lawyers [could] hope to avoid
the many hidden pitfalls."'26 As a result, few such comprehensive liens
were created.
On the other hand, there were some apparent advantages to a sys-
tem which effectively restricted personal property security. Where small
business assets were not effectively encumbered by security interests, they
were available to satisfy the claims of the debtor's unsecured creditors,
chiefly trade creditors and employees. While Article Nine was under
consideration in California in the early 1960's, representatives of un-
secured creditors' trade associations complained that the new Code
would give too much power to the first lender at the expense of furnishers
of labor and materials on unsecured credit 27 and that it would be "detri-
mental to the wholesalers, manufacturers, distributors, and others selling
on an unsecured basis."' 28 Since trade creditors and employees are gener-
ally less able to bear losses than are large-scale financers, the de facto
preservation of a "cushion of free assets" 29 appeared to result in a more
equitable division of a bankrupt debtor's assets than if all assets were
allocated to the primary secured creditor.
It was in this context that the movement for a Uniform Commercial
22. The pre-Code system of secured credit combined state common and statutory law.
The details varied from state to state, and the balance struck likewise varied within a fairly
broad range.
23. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment.
24. Gilmore, Dedication to Professor Homer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 9 (1981);
Kripke, Reflections of a Drafter: Homer Kripke, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 577, 577 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Kripke, Reflections]; Kripke, Current Assets Financing as a Source of Long-Term Capi-
tal, 36 MINN. L. REV. 506, 506-07 (1952).
25. Kripke, Reflections, supra note 24, at 578.
26. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 11.7, at 360; see also Gilmore, supra note 24, at 11.
27. Hearing on Uniform Commercial Code (Senate Bill 1093) Before California Senate
Comm. on Judiciary 12-17 (1961) (testimony of Martin Gendel, representing five credit
associations).
28. Id. at 18 (testimony of James M. Conners, representing five credit associations).
29. The phrase is from U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 2.
July 1986] ALL OBLIGATIONS CLAUSES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Code came to fruition in the late 1950's. A system of personal property
security which appeared to restrict the availability of secured credit to
business, and thus to impede economic growth, did not commend itself
to a country recently emerged from the Depression and embarking upon
a period of prolonged economic expansion. 30 The operational balance
inherited from the past would no longer do. What was needed was a
system which would give free play to the expansive forces of American
capitalism.
Article Nine became not another modest step along the evolutionary
path of traditional personal property security law, but a qualitative alter-
ation of the path itself-a new way, 31 built of both new and salvaged
materials, designed to encourage the extension of credit on a secured ba-
sis, with the immediate goal of expanding the availability of commercial
secured credit, and the ultimate goal of promoting economic growth.
32
The new Code would liberalize the law of secured credit from the restric-
tions of the past, democratizing it so that virtually all financers and small
businesses could easily, cheaply, and safely engage in secured transac-
tions. The new Code would also destroy the old operational balance be-
tween secured and unsecured creditors.
The innovations made by the Code are not minor. First, and above
all, Article Nine is a paean to freedom of contract, private property, and
free enterprise. Abolishing old legal restrictions based on the type of col-
30. Kripke, Reflections, supra note 24, at 603.
31. Some do not agree that Article Nine was revolutionary. "[A]rticle 9 . . . is not a
revolution. It marks but the culminating step of an evolution in which techniques developed in
the more modem and sophisticated forms of financing are applied to their older and more
backward cousins." Leary, Secured Transactions-Revolution or Evolution, 22 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 54, 66 (1967). "[Tlhe UCC merely codifies and simplifies prior commercial practice.
There is nothing that the UCC permits that could not be done without it." Kripke, Law and
Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 929, 975 (1985). These authors focus on legal technique-process-rather
than Article Nine's radical substantive shift in priorities favoring the primary perfected se-
cured creditor and against secondary secured and general creditors. Professor Gilmore vacil-
lated. In 1951, he wrote of Article Nine, "No other Article of the Code proposes so radical a
departure from prior law." Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial
Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 27 (1951); see also id. at 28 ("Article 9 ... deliberately
cuts loose from all anchorage in the past."). In 1965, he stated in his two-volume treatise:
"Article 9 is not so much a new start or a fresh approach as it is a reflection of work long since
accomplished." 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 9.2, at 290. In 1981, in one of his last articles,
Professor Gilmore implicitly conceded that the issue was not process but substance-the prior-
ity given to the primary secured party-and that Article Nine had made revolutionary changes
in favor of the secured creditor, changes which he thought were ill-advised. Gilmore, The
Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant
Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620-28 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore, Good Faith
Purchase ].
32. Kripke, supra note 31, at 975; Leary, supra note 31, at 55, 57.
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lateral and the form of the security instrument,3 3 the Code allows the
debtor and creditor, in a single agreement, to secure all the debtor's le-
gally enforceable obligations to the creditor with virtually all of the
debtor's present and future assets.34 Second, the Code substantially
reduces the primary secured creditor's35 economic and legal risks by cre-
ating a juggernaut of priority in her favor 36 and by leaving few legal bar-
riers which could be set up by those who would block the machine's
progress. 37 Third, the Code substantially reduces most secured creditors'
monitoring costs, since the focus of insecurity is shifted from the debtor's
overall financial position to the status of the particular collateral.38 Fi-
nally, the Code reduces transaction costs relative to the total dollar value
of the credit extended.
39
Although the drafters believed that the new Code would success-
fully encourage the extension of credit on a secured basis, with the salu-
tary result of promoting economic growth, they never clearly stated the
economic assumptions upon which their beliefs rested. The drafters ap-
parently regarded the supply side of the debtor-creditor relationship as
crucial. What mattered was, first, the willingness of highly risk-averse
financial institutions to lend substantial sums to small businesses and,
second, their willingness to make such loans at reasonable rates of inter-
est. Reducing both the legal risks and the overall transaction costs of the
highly technical pre-Code system would plainly help, but, standing
alone, would have only a minor impact. The key additional elements
were the expansion of the allowable scope of the security interest coupled
with the allocation of overwhelming priority to the primary secured cred-
itor. By substantially reducing financial institutions' risks through prior-
ity secured credit, the Code would attract more capital into the small
business sector than ever before.
The new system of secured credit would have both positive and neg-
ative effects upon trade creditors-those who sell goods and services to
33. U.C.C. §§ 9-102(1), (2), -102 comment 1, -101 comment.
34. Id. § 9-201.
35. A "primary secured creditor" in this Article is one who has satisfied all the condi-
tions for achieving the maximum possible priority for interests securing both primary and
secondary obligations as against rival claimants to the collateral.
36. U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to -318.
37. Id. §§ 9-201, -303 to -305, -401 to -408.
38. On monitoring in secured transactions, see Jackson & Kroman, Secured Financing
and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1147-61 (1979); Kripke, supra note 31, at
966-69; Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE
L.J. 49 (1982); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-14 (1981).
39. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment; Kripke, supra note 31, at 975 & n.166.
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commercial debtors on relatively short-term and traditionally unsecured
credit. Most positively, the increased availability of secured credit
would help trade creditors as a class by increasing the market for their
goods and services. But the negative effects were not inconsequential.
Some traditionally unsecured trade creditors would begin to require se-
curity, resulting in a net increase in transaction costs with little or no
increase in the amount of credit. In a market where a debtor's "cushion
of free assets" was reduced or eliminated, the remaining unsecured trade
creditors' risk of nonpayment would grow substantially, while competi-
tive pressures would limit the extent to which they could raise prices to
compensate for the increased risk.
However they thought these matters through, the drafters of Article
Nine plainly acted on the assumption-indeed, the faith-that the over-
all economic benefits of the new system would exceed its costs.4° This
faith, as all others in the twentieth century, has been both questioned
4 '
and defended, 42 most recently in the court of neoclassical economics.
Whatever the verdict of modern economists as to the efficiency of
Article Nine, the systemic assumptions of the drafters and adopting legis-
lators constitute a normative reference for judicial interpretation of the
Code. Recognizing that the Code is squarely within the Realist tradition
of law as social engineering,43 courts should interpret and apply the Code
to promote economic growth through the specific means chosen by the
legislatures: encouraging the extension of secured credit by favoring pri-
mary secured creditors over their rivals, and generally reducing primary
secured creditors' legal risks and overall transaction costs.
Justifying the Revolution: Efficiency, Distributive Justice, and the
Code Comments
Systemic economic efficiency is one thing; distributive justice among
the creditors of a common debtor is another.44 The drafters of Article
Nine and the legislators who adopted it assumed not only that the Code
is economically efficient, but that the burdens it imposes upon sub-
40. Schwartz, supra note 38, at 2.
41. E.g., Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051
(1984); Schwartz, supra note 38.
42. E.g., Jackson & Kroman, supra note 38; Kripke, supra note 31, at 934-55; Levmore,
supra note 38; White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 473 (1984).
43. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Impli-
cations for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 797-800 (1978).
44. See generally Kroman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472
(1980).
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ordinate creditors when the common debtor fails are justified. The latter
conclusion is at least open to question.45 When a debtor goes bankrupt,
the secured creditors, who tend to be relatively large institutions, often
take most or all of the assets, leaving little or nothing to the unsecured
creditors, who tend to be small trade creditors, employees, or even tort
claimants. 46 It may be that all of us benefit from the system, but it often
doesn't look as though that's so in particular cases.47
Not surprisingly, there is a continuing tension under the new regime
between the presumed benefits to the economy at large of promoting se-
cured credit and the obvious distributional inequality resulting from the
allocation in particular cases of substantially all the assets to the rich and
strong and all the losses to the poor and weak. Reacting adversely to the
Code's apparent distributional unfairness in individual cases, courts may
undertake a sort of counter-revolutionary guerilla action at the margins
of the Code by holding that the primary secured creditor and the debtor
did not intend to secure a particular secondary obligation.
48
The corrosive effects of the tension between systemic requirements
and individualized justice are compounded by the failure of the drafters
of Article Nine to explain clearly in their Comments the policy basis for
discarding the operationally restrictive pre-Code system and adopting
Article Nine in its place. The most detailed explanation of the new
Code's comprehensive validation of the floating lien-the creditor's se-
curity interest in the debtor's after-acquired property, and the corner-
stone of the new system-is contained in Comment 2 to section 9-204,
which states in part:
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against the floating
charge was based on a feeling, often inarticulate in the opinions, that a
commercial borrower should not be allowed to encumber all his assets
45. Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269, 270 (1970);
Kripke, supra note 31, at 930-31.
46. Schwartz, supra note 38, at 2. On tort claimants in bankruptcy, see generally Note,
Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Credit System: Asbestos Times, the Worst of Times, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1984).
47. Although the law of secured transactions would seem to offer a mother lode for those
who would mine the legal system for ideology and facially neutral rules applied in the service
of an oppressive class structure, there seems to be no critical legal study of the area. For
critical legal studies of contract law suggesting the possibilities of such approaches, see, e.g.,
Dalton, An Essay in the Destruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Feinberg,
Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983); Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983).
48. E.g., In re Eshleman, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 750, 753 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1972), discussed infra text accompanying notes 220-25.
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present and future, and that for the protection not only of the bor-
rower but of his other creditors a cushion of free assets should be pre-
served. That inarticulate premise has much to recommend it. This
Article decisively rejects it not on the ground that it was wrong in
policy but on the ground that it was not effective. In pre-Code law
there was a multiplication of security devices designed to avoid the
policy: field warehousing, trust receipts, factor's lien acts and so on.
The cushion of free assets was not preserved. In almost every state it
was possible before the Code for the borrower to give a lien on every-
thing he held or would have. There have no doubt been sufficient eco-
nomic reasons for the change. This Article, in expressly validating the
floating charge, merely recognizes an existing state of things.
49
This historical analysis of pre-Code law certainly contains a core of
truth. If the policy of the classical common law was to preserve a sub-
stantial cushion of the debtor's assets free from the claims of secured
creditors, the policy had been severely eroded by various statutory de-
vices. Although the cushion of free assets was not entirely eliminated, it
was greatly reduced in those industries whose assets and form of opera-
tions were suited to financing under one of the special statutory forms of
security.
Still, the Comment is seriously flawed in ways which have contrib-
uted to interpretive difficulties. The Comment understates the extent to
which the cushion of free assets was in fact preserved in pre-Code law,
and thus implicitly understates the extent to which Article Nine was a
revolution in favor of secured creditors against the whole class of general
creditors. Before the adoption of the Code, neither state legislatures nor
the courts had deliberately rejected the ancient policy of preserving a
cushion of free assets, nor had they adopted such comprehensive freedom
of debtor-creditor contract in all commercial financing as that embodied
in Article Nine. The use of the pre-Code security devices was so expen-
sive and risky50 that much potential security was not taken and many
assets remained free. 51 It is thus highly misleading to say, as does Com-
ment 2, that in pre-Code law the "cushion of free assets was not pre-
served," and that Article Nine, "in expressly validating the floating
charge, merely recognizes an existing state of things. ' 52 In fact, Article
Nine was, and was intended to be, revolutionary.
More serious than the drafters' failure to state clearly what they
49. U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 2.
50. Id. § 9-101 comment. The clear implications of the historical account given in the
comment to section 9-101 cannot be reconciled with the account given in section 9-204 com-
ments 2 and 5. For the reasons stated above, the comment to section 9-101 is, in my opinion,
the more accurate.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
52. U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 2.
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were doing was their failure to state clearly why they were doing it.
Strangely, in Comment 2 the drafters approved the ancient policy of re-
stricting the reach of secured creditors to protect debtors and general
creditors. This of course raises the interesting question of why, if the
ancien regime was correct in policy, the Code did not restore and
strengthen the old restrictions on secured creditors, instead of over-
throwing them completely. And why, if the old restrictions were correct
in policy, did the drafters not believe that the new Code should be read
narrowly by the courts against secured creditors and in favor of general
creditors?
Having explicitly praised the policy of the ancien regime which Ar-
ticle Nine proposed at last to bury, the drafters offered only shallow justi-
fications for their revolution. Simplifying the formalities of creation and
perfection of a security interest did not justify Article Nine's systemic
shift in priorities. It is vacuous to argue, as the drafters did in Comment
2, that Article Nine is correct in policy because the old policy, also cor-
rect, was not maintained for unspecified economic reasons.53 The argu-
ment implies that law is determined by impersonal economic forces,
which we are powerless to control. In fact, the drafters believed they had
substantial control, and that there were good and sufficient reasons for
adopting Article Nine. But these reasons were not clearly stated in the
Comments.
Just as the drafters failed to justify their full validation of after-ac-
quired property clauses, so they also failed to explain adequately the
Code's validation of future advance and all obligations clauses. The
Comments simply do not discuss in detail the securing of a performance
obligation other than an obligation to pay money. The principal discus-
sion of future advance clauses is in Comment 5 to section 9-204, which
states in part:
At common law and under chattel mortgage statutes there seems to
have been vaguely articulated prejudice against future advance agree-
ments comparable to the prejudice against after-acquired property in-
terests. Although only a few jurisdictions went to the length of
invalidating interests claimed by virtue of future advances, judicial lim-
itations severely restricted the usefulness of such arrangements.... In
line with the policy of this Article toward after-acquired property,
[section 9-204(3)] validates the future advance interest, provided only
that the obligation be covered by the security agreement.54
Here, again, the historical account given by the drafters is mislead-
53. Id.
54. Id. comment 5.
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ing at best. Although there was a concern evident in pre-Code law,5 5 as
there is under the Code itself, that future advance clauses might be
abused to the detriment of both borrowers and third-party creditors, con-
trary to the impression given by the drafters, pre-Code law generally fa-
vored future advance clauses. Professor Gilmore noted the discrepancy
in pre-Code law between the favorable treatment given future advance
clauses and the hostility directed toward after-acquired property
clauses. 56 An influential property law treatise stated that parol evidence
could be used to show that future advances were to be secured under a
mortgage, and observed that "[t]he courts are liberal in construing the
parties' agreement as including future advances."' 57 It is difficult to find
in this any "prejudice" against future advance clauses.
The drafters' discussion of future advance clauses is not simply mis-
leading history; it also fails completely to state affirmatively the policy
basis for the Code's validating of and allocating priority to security inter-
ests arising from future advances. Indeed, by its cross-reference to the
earlier discussion of after-acquired property clauses, the Comment im-
plies that whatever hostility to future advance clauses did exist in pre-
Code law had a sound policy basis, and that the new Code is without
adequate justification.
It is probable that the drafters deliberately minimized the extent of
the Article Nine revolution and only hinted at the ultimate policy bases
for the Code as tactical devices to assist passage of the Code through
instinctively conservative state legislatures responding to equally con-
servative commercial interests. However, as in revolutions since the be-
ginning of time, the means of achieving success compromised the ideals
of the revolution and affected the operation of the new regime. In Article
Nine, the failure of the drafters to state clearly what they were doing and
why they were doing it has left the courts without guidance in answering
difficult questions involving future advance and all obligations clauses.
This Article shall now try to suggest the missing guidance.
55. E.g., First v. Byrne, 238 Iowa 712,715-16, 28 N.W.2d 509, 511 (1947); Gillet v. Bank
of America, 160 N.Y. 549, 557, 55 N.E. 292, 294 (1899); 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CON-
VEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 372, at 643 (rev. ed. 1940) (future advances must be made in
good faith).
56. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 35.3, at 921-22.
57. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.72, at 136 n.8 (A. Casner ed. 1952). The same
liberality was noted in G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 184 n.7
(1951).
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The Security Agreement as Contract: The Validity of Future
Advance and All Obligations Clauses
The historical roots of modem personal property security law are
found in property law.58 Although liens and titles, with various proce-
dural appurtenances, run together throughout the long history of secur-
ity law, the pledgor and mortgagor have always given and the pledgee
and mortgagee have always acquired (or retained) legal entitlement in
the nature of a property interest.5 9 The allowable scope of various secur-
ity devices was in significant part a function of the law's regulation of
relations among rival claimants to the common debtor's assets-a func-
tion, that is, of the property law's customary office of regulating relations
among persons with respect to specific goods and intangible legal entitle-
ments.60 Under the old regime, a security interest in favor of a creditor
often varied in "validity" depending on form, timing, recording, and
other circumstances, as a security instrument might be valid against the
debtor and some classes of rival claimants, but invalid as to others. 6'
The Security Agreement as Contract
Article Nine is an ingenious compound of traditional property and
modem contract law principles. 62 The Code's priority system is struc-
58. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (Court assumed that a
security interest is a private property interest within the meaning of the takings clause of the
fifth amendment); 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1.1-9.2.
59. In one sense, both real and personal property security law is purely remedial, that is,
a system of consensual remedies for the debtor's breach of the underlying obligation to the
creditor, enforceable by operation of law against third parties to the extent of the secured
creditor's priority. Analytically, however, the special remedy has been treated as incidental to
the secured creditor's property interest created by the debtor's voluntary conveyance.
60. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, ch. 1, Introductory Note (1936); R. CUNNINGHAM,
W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.1-.2 (1984).
61. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 2.2; 1 L. JONES, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES
AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 237 (6th ed. 1933) (chattel mortgage effective between the parties
although statutory requirements of form, recording, and the like not met, but void as against
nonparties, or as to purchasers, mortgagees, and creditors of mortgagor without notice); 3 Id.
§ 1072 (conditional sale valid except as to those persons recording statutes designed to protect
when recording statutes not complied with); Nickles, Rights and Remedies Between U.C.C.
Article 9 Secured Parties with Conflicting Security Interests in Goods, 68 IOWA L. REv. 217,
226-27 & nn.33-37 (1983) (discussing pre-Code statutes' voiding of unfiled chattel security
instruments as against certain third parties).
62. Article Nine, no less than pre-Code law, is in one sense a system of special consensual
remedies. See supra note 59. While difficult remedial problems pervade Article Nine, this
Article will follow the Code itself in focusing on the Article Nine security agreement as a
contractual creation of a property interest. Compare the landlord-tenant relationship, in which
contract and property conceptions are also intertwined. Chase & Taylor, Landlord and Ten-
ant: A Study in Property and Contract, 30 VILL. L. REV. 571 (1985); Humbach, The Common-
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tured primarily on traditional property law bases. The creation and ini-
tial validity of a security interest, however, are largely separated from
property principles and are redefined in terms of contract law. Thus,
under the Code, a security interest is created by an "agreement" between
the debtor and the creditor,63 which is the "bargain of the parties in fact"
as found in all the relevant circumstances, 64 and which is given legal
effect as a "contract.
' 65
Basing the secured creditor-debtor relationship in contract was in
part a legal vehicle for allowing a substantially increased degree of free-
dom to debtors and creditors in structuring their ongoing commercial
relations on a secured basis. At the same time, it was in part an act of
creative destruction, freeing the law of secured transactions from concep-
tual and practical impediments of the past. For example, the old prop-
erty-based system had conceptual difficulties validating a present security
interest in after-acquired property since you generally cannot convey a
title which you do not yet have.66 However, the modem conceptions of
contract, whether as an enforceable present commitment relating to the
future67 or as an exchange projected into the future, 6 readily accommo-
date the idea that a bargain concluded today can include a commitment
which will bind you as an encumbrance on property you acquire in the
future. Moreover, shifting security law from property to contract re-
moved many of the formal rocks and shoals of conveyancing which in
the past had so clogged the streams of asset-based financing as to make
passage hazardous for all.
Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and Dependence of Covenants, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1213 (1983).
63. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -203(1)(a).
64. Id. § 1-201(3).
65. Id. § 1-201(11).
66. 1. G. GILMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2.3-.4, 7.10.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1-3 (1981).
68. See generally I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MOD-
ERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980) [hereinafter cited as I. MACNEIL, SOCIAL CON-
TRACT]; Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Macneil, Contracts]; Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Macneil, Many Futures]; Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and
Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483 [hereinafter cited as Macneil, Relational Contract].
The U.C.C., emphasizing commercial context, reasonableness, and flexibility as touch-
stones, effectively embraces many aspects of the "relational" contract. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(3), 1-
205, 2-208, 2-209, 1-201 comment 3, 1-205 comments 1-10. The "relational" nature of an
ongoing secured debtor-creditor relationship is discussed infra text accompanying notes 105-
07.
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Section 9-201: General Validation
Section 9-201 is the provision in Article Nine which generally vali-
dates security agreements. It evolved from an uncertain statement in ear-
lier drafts to become a strong substantive provision in later versions.
Section 9-201 of the 1952 Code provided:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act or by other rule of law or
regulation, a security agreement is effective according to its terms be-
tween the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against cred-
itors. Nothing in this Article validates any charge or practice illegal
under any rule of law or regulation governing usury, small loans, retail
installment sales, or the like .... 69
In this form Section 9-201 was plainly inadequate. It clearly vali-
dated only those terms of an Article Nine security agreement which were
never invalid under pre-Code law. The whole weight of change in the
scope of validation was to be carried by other provisions of Article Nine.
To the extent that the other provisions could not carry the burden, the
pre-Code rules would remain in place, blocking progress and defeating
the purpose of Article Nine. The 1953 version of the Code added to the
Comment in section 9-201 the statement that the exception was "not in-
tended to preserve as against this Code any rule of law in direct conflict
with a substantive rule stated in the Code."'70 But amending the Com-
ment was not enough. In 1956, the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion recommended that the text be changed, noting that "the phrase 'or
by other rule of law or regulation' in the first sentence of [section 9-201]
raises a question as to the continued operation under Article 9 of com-
mon-law rules of consideration, bona fide purchaser, constructive fraud
on creditors, and the like.
' '71
Implementing the suggestion of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission, the drafters of the Code deleted the qualifying phrase and other-
wise narrowed the exceptions to section 9-201's validation of security
agreements. Section 9-201, which has not been changed since 1957, now
reads in part:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is effec-
tive according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors. Nothing in this Article validates
any charge or practice illegal under any statute or regulation thereun-
69. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1952) (emphasis added), reprinted in 16 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE DRAFTS 212 (E. Kelly ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C. DRAFTS].
70. U.C.C. § 9-201 comment (1953), reprinted in 16 U.C.C. DRAFrS, supra note 69, at
212-13.
71. NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956: REPORT RE-
LATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, app. IV, at 468-69 (Legis. Doe. No. 65,
1956).
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der governing usury, small loans, retail installment sales, or the like
72
Section 9-201, as modified in 1957, became the structural heart of
Article Nine. Leaving aside non-Code statutes and derivative rules, sec-
tion 9-201, without the aid of any other substantive provision of the
Code, validates any commercial security agreement between the parties
and against third parties. Apart from non-Code common-law policing
provisions incorporated generally through section 1-103,7 3 the only Code
exceptions to validity applicable to all security agreements are contained
in section 9-203, which states that for a security interest to attach to
collateral and be enforceable, there must be an agreement between the
parties meeting certain formalities, the creditor must have given value,
and the debtor must have rights in the collateral.74 The requirement that
the security agreement meet certain formalities is in the nature of a stat-
ute of frauds. 75 The requirement that the creditor give value,76 taken
with the definition of "agreement, ' 77 is in the nature of a consideration
requirement. The debtor need not be obligated to repay the value given,
nor must any particular obligation to repay which does arise be among
the obligations secured. Finally, the requirement that the debtor have
rights in the collateral is a remnant of traditional property law-
whatever your contractual commitments, you cannot actually "convey"
an entitlement until you "have" it.
Briefly stated, under section 9-201 alone the parties to a commercial
security agreement can effectively secure the payment or performance of
any past, present, or future legally enforceable obligation of the debtor to
the creditor, and can do so with any of the debtor's existing or subse-
quently acquired personal property. Section 9-201 thus generally vali-
dates future advance and all obligations clauses against both debtors and
third parties. Those agreements not meeting the formalities required by
section 9-203 and those agreements running afoul of the common-law
policing doctrines are the only commercially important exceptions.
Section 9-204: A Substantively Irrelevant Exposition
Section 9-204 specifically addresses after-acquired property and fu-
ture advance clauses in security agreements. The section has had a
checkered career, which it would be more tedious than instructive to re-
72. U.C.C. § 9-201.
73. Id. § 1-103 (principles of law and equity supplement Code provisions).
74. Id. § 9-203(1).
75. Id. § 9-203 comment 5.
76. Id. §§ 1-201(44) (defining "value"), 9-203(l)(b).
77. Id. § 1-201(3) (defining "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact").
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count in detail.78 Before the revision of section 9-201 in 1957,7 9 when the
only explicit validation provisions were in sections other than section 9-
201, section 9-204 broadly validated future advance and all obligations
clauses.8 0 The Comments to section 9-204, to this extent unchanged
from the 1952 version, still indicate that the section "serves to validate
the . . . 'cross-security' clause, '81 and "validates the future advance
interest. '82 However, once section 9-201 became a substantive provi-
sion validating security agreements, 83 section 9-204 ceased to validate
anything.
As applied to commercial financing arrangements, section 9-204 is
merely a partial, imperfect, declaratory exposition of section 9-201's gen-
eral substantive validation. Section 9-204 now provides, in part:
(3) ... [A] security agreement may provide that collateral, when-
ever acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the security
agreement ....
(5) Obligations covered by a security agreement may include fu-
ture advances or other value whether or not the advances or value are
given pursuant to commitment. 84
Section 9-204's exposition of section 9-201 is imperfect because it fails to
state explicitly that the parties may validly secure with existing collateral
the debtor's performance obligations, that is, the debtor's obligations
other than to repay money for value extended by the creditor. 85
In the end, the shortcomings of section 9-204 should not, and usu-
ally do not, matter much. If section 9-201 is correctly interpreted and
applied in commercial cases, section 9-204 is simply irrelevant. Further-
more, most courts at least implicitly recognize that the Code allows the
parties to a security agreement to secure payment or performance of all
the debtor's legally enforceable obligations to the creditor.
Although the Code allows the parties to secure all the debtor's obli-
gations, questions often arise in particular cases as to whether the parties
originally intended to go as far as the Code permits, and, if so, what
78. Compare U.C.C. § 9-204(3), (5) (1952), reprinted in 17 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note
69, at 217, with U.C.C. § 9-204(3), (5) (1962), reprinted in 23 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 69,
at 423, and with U.C.C. § 9-204(1), (3).
79. See supra notes 69-72 & accompanying text.
80. U.C.C. § 9-204(3), (5) (1952), reprinted in 17 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 69, at 217.
81. U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 5 (1952), reprinted in 17 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 69, at
219; U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 3.
82. U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 8 (1952), reprinted in 17 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 69, at
220; U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 5.
83. See supra text accompanying note 73.
84. U.C.C. § 9-204(3), (5).
85. For a discussion of performance obligations, see infra note 276 & accompanying text.
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restrictions might limit claims which have been enlarged through the
creditor's overreaching or abusive behavior. We now turn to these
problems.
Security Agreement as Contract: Determining Intent
The freedom of contract which Article Nine embodies leads to diffi-
cult problems of interpreting broad future advance or all obligations
clauses in security agreements. If an original security agreement con-
tains a clause securing all obligations of the debtor to the creditor, and
over time the debtor becomes obligated to the creditor in a number of
transactions and in a variety of ways, by what standards do we decide
which of these obligations was "intended" by the parties to be secured?
Article Nine, in common with the rest of the Code, embodies a thor-
oughly modern, contextual theory of contract. 86 There are few specific
interpretive rules.87 A security agreement is first of all an agreement, 88
which is defined in Article One as the "bargain of the parties in fact." 89
The terms of the bargain-in-fact are to be determined from the parties'
"language" and from any other relevant circumstances. 90 The meaning
of the parties' language and the terms of the bargain are in part functions
of reasonableness in the particular circumstances within a larger com-
mercial context. 91 The legal effect of the parties' bargain is determined
86. On the "contextual approach" to contracts, see Speidel, An Essay on the Reported
Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1172-77 (1975) (discussing
the replacement of the "grand theory" of contracts with a "contextual approach [which] fo-
cuses upon particular types of contracts within a relevant business or social setting").
87. If we characterize Article Nine as a purely remedial statute, see supra notes 59 and
62, then the Code may provide, at least inferentially, a rule of liberal interpretation through
U.C.C. § 1-106(1), which states, "The remedies provided by [the Code] shall be liberally ad-
ministered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed ...." However, the drafters of the Code did not conceive of Article
Nine as purely a contract remedy and probably did not intend § 1-106(1) to apply directly to
Article Nine. See U.C.C. § 1-106 comments 1-3 (no reference to Article Nine). Nonetheless,
§ 1-106(1) and the inferences which may be drawn from it are fully consistent with the draft-
ers' approach to Article Nine.
88. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(1).
89. Id. § 1-201(3).
90. Id. In Estate of Beyer v. Bank of Pennsylvania, 449 Pa. 24, 27, 295 A.2d 280, 281-82
(1972), the court, citing U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h) (1962) (9-105(l)(1) in the 1978 version) (defini-
tion of security agreement), used a course of dealing between the creditor and debtor over six
years as evidence that a form security agreement with a future advance clause was intended to
provide continuing security for the creditor's future advances.
91. U.C.C. § 1-205 comment 1; Carroll, Harpooning Whales of Which Karl N. Llewellyn
Is the Hero of the Piece; or Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral,
12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 139, 154-78 (1970); Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and
Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L.
REV. 213, 220-22, 241-44 (1966); cf Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform
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not only by the Code itself, but also by the common law of contracts. 92
The law of contracts includes general interpretive standards which may
apply to agreements under the Code, such as the rule that an ambiguous
writing is interpreted against the drafter.
93
Since standards of interpretation can best be defined and explicated
with reference to circumstances, we can focus this discussion with a hy-
pothetical security agreement. Assume a commercial bank is the lender
and a small business is the borrower and debtor. After preliminary dis-
cussions, the debtor submits a formal request for a substantial secured
loan from the bank.94 The loan officer and the debtor further discuss
terms, focusing on the principal amount, the repayment schedule, inter-
est and other charges, collateral, reporting requirements, and the like.
The loan officer and debtor may go even further, specifically discussing
all significant parts of the proposed arrangement, including the provision
that all obligations of the debtor to the creditor will be secured.
To the extent that the security agreement is actually read, discussed,
and understood by both parties at the time of closing, it is largely indis-
tinguishable from a fully negotiated contract even though the agreement
is embodied in a printed form. The terms of such an agreement should
be determined by much the same process and standards as those of a
fully negotiated agreement.
Under both the Code95 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,96
the process of interpreting a written agreement begins with the language
used. Ordinarily, the creditor will contend that a broad future advance
or all obligations clause means just what it appears to say, and the debtor
or other litigant adverse to the creditor will contend that the clause in
question has a narrower meaning. Under these circumstances, the Re-
statement (Second)'s rules in aid of interpretation prefer the "generally
prevailing meaning" urged by the creditor unless some special circum-
stances known to both contracting parties support the narrower interpre-
Commercial Code, 51 OR. L. REv. 269, 276 (1972) ("The underlying philosophy of the
changes in contract law effected by Article 2 may be stated as follows: a more precise and fair
identification of the actual or presumed assent of the parties.") (emphasis in original).
92. U.C.C. §§ 1-103, -201(3), (11).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
94. R. HAYES, BUSINESS LOANS 153-62 (2d ed. 1980); J. SIMMONS, CREATIVE BUSINESS
FINANCING 21-26, 42-69 (1982).
95. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (terms of agreement are found in the language of the parties and
other relevant circumstances).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (formation of contract ordi-
narily requires manifestation of mutual assent); id. § 19(1) (manifestation of mutual assent
may be by written words).
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tation.97 Moreover, the debtor is presumed to have reason to know the
"generally prevailing meaning" attached to the future advance or all obli-
gations clause. Even if the debtor in fact had no reason to know of the
prevailing meaning the Restatement (Second) would still prefer the credi-
tor's interpretation over that of the debtor unless the debtor communi-
cated his narrower interpretation to the creditor.98 Of course, even
broad future advance or all obligations clauses should not protect abusive
behavior by creditors, and courts should restrain overreaching through
enforcement of the creditor's duty of good faith.99
Rules of interpretation premised on the parties' actual understand-
ing of the terms of a written agreement at the time of execution are not
always applicable. In most commercial loan negotiations involving a
professional lender and a small business borrower, the terms of secon-
dary importance, such as a future advance or all obligations provision,
are probably not specifically read, discussed, or understood by either the
loan officer or the debtor. Probably the loan officer and the debtor dis-
cuss the possibility that the bank may make additional loans to the busi-
ness in the future, particularly if the business succeeds and requires
additional capital to expand. Both the loan officer and the debtor under-
stand generally that future loans will be secured. At the final closing, the
debtor executes a promissory note and a long printed-form security
agreement, with blanks filled in and appropriate boxes checked. The
agreement grants the bank a security interest in substantially all the ex-
isting and after-acquired personalty of the business. One of the clauses in
the agreement states that the security interest specifically secures repay-
ment of the promissory note and any extensions or renewals, and addi-
tionally secures all obligations of the debtor to the bank of whatever
nature, whenever and however arising or incurred. The printed all obli-
gations clause is not read by the debtor, or, if read, is not fully
comprehended.
Examined with reference to modem contract theory, the circum-
stances under which most commercial non-purchase-money security
agreements'0° are concluded suggest at least two characteristics which
97. Id. § 202(3)(a) ("Unless a different intention is manifested ... where language has a
generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning .
98. Id. § 201(2)(b); cf id. § 20(2)(b) (effect of misunderstanding).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 113-37.
100. A security interest is "purchase money" if it is taken by the seller of the collateral to
secure payment of the portion of the purchase price remaining due, or if it is taken by a
creditor to secure the debtor's repayment of value extended by the creditor to enable the
debtor to purchase the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-107. Most purchase money security agreements
concluded by sellers of collateral on credit probably do not have future advance or all obliga-
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compound the difficulties of determining which obligations are within the
agreement's intended scope. First, the security agreement is from the
outset a relational contract.101 The bank or other lending agency and the
debtor enter into a long-term contractual debtor-creditor relationship.
The elements of the relationship, and in particular the origin, purpose,
form, or amount of obligations which may in the future be owed by the
debtor to the bank, cannot be stated with precision because they are un-
known. The bank is willing to become the debtor's banker, a continuing
source of credit and provider of services should the debtor remain wor-
thy, but only if the whole relationship is placed on a secured basis. The
debtor expects to continue to need credit and banking services, and un-
derstands generally that the bank will require security for any loans and
related charges which may become due. But beyond these general under-
standings concerning an indefinite future, the parties in most cases will
have no focused intent as to the secured status of specific obligations
which may later arise.
The second complicating characteristic is that the commercial se-
curity agreement is often also functionally a contract of adhesion,0 2 at
least as to the standard-form future advance or all obligations clause
which is not read or understood by the debtor. The bank, as a profes-
sional with money to lend, is plainly the dominant party with the power
to offer small business loans on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The bank has
made a policy decision, 03 which the loan officer enforces in particular
tions clauses. The same may be true when the financing agency is not the seller of the collat-
eral, although some purchase money security agreements concluded by banks and finance
companies do contain such clauses.
101. See generally I. MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 68; Gillette, Commercial
Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 67 MINN. L. REV. 521 (198 1); Goetz
& Scott, Principles ofRelational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Gottlieb, Relationism:
Legal Theory for a Relational Society, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 567 (1983); Macneil, Contracts,
supra note 68; Macneil, Many Futures, supra note 68; Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note
68; Mulloch, The New Paradigm of Contract: A Hermeneutical Approach, 17 VA. L. REV. 677
(1983).
102. A "contract of adhesion" is a printed-form agreement presented by the dominant
party to the weaker party, the adherent, on an explicitly or implicitly take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5, 7 n.4 (1984);
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1174, 1177
(1983). The literature of adhesion contracts is extensive. For reviews of the most important,
see id. at 1197-1220. Many discussions of adhesion contracts assume the adherent is a con-
sumer, but a small business dealing with a large firm can plainly be an adherent to a printed,
standard-form contract. See Allen v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 18 Mich. App. 632, 171 N.W.2d
689 (1969) (exculpatory clause in printed-form contract for advertising in phone book unen-
forceable on grounds of public policy); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-9 (2d ed. 1980).
103. Professor Rakoff emphasizes that both the use and the content of standard forms is in
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cases through her selection of forms, that it will make a relatively large
loan against a large portion of a small business debtor's assets only if the
total bank-debtor relationship is placed on a fully secured basis. The all
obligations clause preserves the bank's freedom of future action and
reduces several risks, including the risk of the bank's own bureaucratic
failure to execute or file proper security documents in future credit trans-
actions with the debtor. From the debtor's standpoint, the all obligations
clause is just not very important, a low-visibility component of the total
arrangement. If he thinks much about it at all, he is likely to conclude
that the all obligations clause is not unreasonable and at least partly
favorable to him, as it seems to complement the bank's suggestion that
additional credit may be available in the future. If the debtor should
negotiate or shop elsewhere for more favorable terms, he will likely ask
for a larger loan, lower interest, and an extended repayment schedule, or
for a security interest in less collateral, rather than for a less-than-all
obligations clause. Moreover, for a large loan against a large portion of
the small business debtor's assets, most, and perhaps all, commercial
financers are likely to require an all obligations clause. In the end, if the
small business debtor wants all that money on the payment terms ulti-
mately offered, with the prospect of more money later, he just signs what
is put in front of him at closing with little or no regard for the printed-
form boilerplate.
The interpretive problems created by the relational, adhesive secur-
ity agreement are severe when, long after the debtor-creditor relationship
originated, a court must decide which of the debtor's subsequent obliga-
tions to the creditor were "intended" to be secured. Since, at the time
the security agreement was entered, the parties had no specific intent as
to particular future obligations, and since the small-business debtor
merely "adhered to" the creditor's standard-form all obligations clause,
the focus of judicial inquiry must shift from ascertaining specific intent,
or specific assent, to interpreting the situation. As Karl Llewellyn
stated, "the conditions and clauses to be read into a bargain are not those
which happen to be printed on the unread paper, but are those which a
sane man might reasonably expect to find on that paper.'l°
Under the Code, the meaning of a broad future advance or all obli-
part a product of a firm's hierarchical structure and allocation of power within the firm.
Rakoff, supra note 102, at 1222-25.
104. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 704 (1939); see also K. LLEWEL-
LYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960):
What has in fact been assented to [by an adherent to a standard-form contract],
specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and
... a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms
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gations clause in a standard-form security agreement between a profes-
sional lender and small business debtor is found in the parties' objectively
reasonable expectations as to the scope of their ongoing debtor-creditor re-
lationship.10 5 The parties use such clauses to put their expected future
dealings on a secured basis. What future obligations of the small business
debtor would the reasonably prudent bank following generally accepted
banking standards and the reasonably prudent small business debtor fol-
lowing generally accepted business practices expect to be secured under
the original security agreement? In general, both will reasonably expect
the obligations of the debtor to the bank incurred in the ordinary course
of the bank-customer relationship to be secured. 10 6 These would include
at least the debtor's obligation to repay any loans and credits, the
debtor's obligation to pay the cost of administering and enforcing the
security agreement, and the debtor's obligation to pay for any banking or
other financial services received. Such services may include safety de-
posit boxes, retirement plans, payroll, insurance, purchase or sale of se-
curities, letters of credit, cash transfers, and financial advice. 10 7
Whether the debtor's obligations to the creditor which arise outside
the usual course of the relationship will be secured under the agreement
will always be a difficult question. On its face, an all obligations clause,
interpreted according to its generally accepted meaning, would operate
to secure literally all legally enforceable obligations of the debtor to the
the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable
meaning of the dickered terms.
Cf Slawson, New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contract Law by Standard
Forms, 46 U. Pr-r. L. REv. 21, 23 (1984) ("[W]hereas under the old meaning [of contract], the
contract is the parties' manifestations of mutual assent, which are interpreted to try to fulfill
their reasonable expectations, under the new meaning the reasonable expectations are the con-
tract."). Professor Rakoff's proposal that a form term should be presumptively unenforceable
to the extent that it deviates from terms established by background law, Rakoff, supra note
102, at 1242-43, presupposes the existence of legally supplied terms as measures of and alterna-
tives to form terms, id. at 1244. Since the Code supplies no such terms to define which of the
debtor's obligations will be secured under a security agreement, the proposal seems inapposite
in the Article Nine context.
105. Gillet v. Bank of America, 160 N.Y. 549, 55 N.E. 292 (1899) (pre-Code law); see
infra text accompanying notes 174-83.
106. Gillet, 160 N.Y. at 556-57, 55 N.E. at 294. The "ordinary course of business" is
intended to be functional, and is necessarily imprecise. Cf U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (defining "buyer
in the ordinary course of business"). Many banking services or transactions have unusual
aspects, but are not as a whole so unusual as to be outside the ordinary course. Other transac-
tions may be so rare or unusual as to be extraordinary for both bank and customer. The bank's
motive may be a factor in determining whether a transaction is ordinary or extraordinary. See
infra text accompanying notes 299-302 (discussion of the secured creditor as assignee of the
debtor's unsecured third-party obligations).
107. Cooley & Pullen, Small-Business Use of Commercial Bank Services, 162 BANKERS
MAG. 72, 73 (1979).
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creditor, however they arose. But the generality of the clause almost in-
vites the secured creditor to exploit the clause opportunistically by claim-
ing that even an extraordinary obligation of the debtor to the creditor is
secured.10 8 The problem of determining the proper limit of the all obli-
gations clause is exacerbated by the relational nature of the contract and
the clause's adhesive origins. In general, courts facing this issue must
apply a judicial rule of reason, itself defined through an inquiry into com-
mercial practice and through the application of standards derived from
the Code and from the non-Code law of contract, agency, surety, trust,
etc. The inquiry may be aided by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts'
general rule that a written standardized agreement "is interpreted wher-
ever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly situated."10 9
Although at this stage the inquiry may still nominally be directed
toward determining the parties' intent, functionally the application of a
judicial rule of reason will operate as a limit on an all obligations clause
in substantially the same manner as the judicial enforcement of the re-
quirement of good faith can operate as a means of regulating secured
creditor behavior. It is to this subject that we now turn.
Regulating Secured Creditor Behavior: The Requirements of
Good Faith and Conscionability
The interests not only of the debtor but also of nonparties are likely
to be directly and adversely affected by the terms, performance, and en-
forcement of a security agreement. Specifically, the interests of rival
claimants to the collateral who are subordinated to the secured party are
likely to be adversely affected by any expansion in the dollar amount of
the secured obligations, and may likewise be affected by the secured
party's foreclosure of the security interest. More generally, the public
has an interest in preserving the integrity of the Article Nine system and,
108. See generally Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN L.
REV. 521 (1981) (discussing the problem of opportunism when a performing party behaves
contrary to the understanding of the other party but not necessarily contrary to the explicit
terms of the contract, resulting in a transfer of wealth from the other party to the performing
party).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(2) (1981). This section is intended
to aid courts which "seek to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of
the public who accepts [a standardized contract]." Id. § 211 comment (e). Although a busi-
ness debtor entering into a long-term relationship with a professional lender is not an "average
member of the public," she certainly should be able reasonably to expect the same treatment
from the lender as other business debtors similarly situated. In this context section 211(2)
seems merely to reformulate the principal problem-determining the objectively reasonable




correlatively, in preventing Article Nine from becoming a publicly sanc-
tioned tool of private oppression.
The courts have always regulated the actions of secured creditors to
protect the interests of parties, interested nonparties, and the public. In
the past, much regulation was simply implicit in the restrictions on the
giving and taking of security interests in general. 110 More particularly,
pre-Code law usually required that a future advance be made in "good
faith" to be secured under a future advance clause. I'
Apart from some controls on the secured party's foreclosure of the
security interest, 112 Article Nine, being principally an enabling statute,
has few provisions regulating secured creditor behavior. However, no
one has ever suggested that the absence of detailed controls in Article
Nine was intended to legitimize secured creditors' actions properly re-
garded as abusive. Although the scope of legitimate action is necessarily
broad, Article Nine is not a blanket license for the secured party to clear
the whole forest of the defahlting debtor's valuable collateral under all
circumstances and by any means whatsoever.
Good Faith
At least at the present stage of legal development, the doctrine of
good faith1 13 should be the principal vehicle for defining and applying
110. Early personal property security law regarded a nonpossessory security interest as
fraudulent and thus invalid against third-party creditors and purchasers of the collateral. This
presumption eroded only slowly. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 2.1.
111. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 35.2, at 920 ("No matter how all-embracing the [fu-
ture advance] clause may be, [in pre-Code law] the mortgagee who seeks to assert a claim
under it will find himself restricted by a rule of reason and good faith."); 1 G. GLENN, supra
note 55, § 372, at 643. A creditor making an advance which expands the dollar value of the
secured obligation is, relative to a third-party claimant to the collateral, in some respects
analogous to a purchaser of the collateral for value, whose entitlement will depend in part on
her bona fides. See generally McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 429 (1977).
112. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-503 (secured party may repossess collateral "without judicial pro-
cess" only "if this can be done without breach of the peace"); id. § 9-504 (notification of fore-
closure sale must be given to appropriate parties, and every aspect of the sale must be
"commercially reasonable"); id. § 9-505 (regulating strict foreclosure); id. § 9-507 (secured
party liable to debtor and certain other interested parties for loss caused by failure to comply
with required foreclosure procedures).
113. Id. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within [the Code] imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981) ("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement."). The leading article on good faith in performance and
enforcement is Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) (arguing that the doctrine of good faith
is best understood as an excluder of various forms of bad behavior). Standards for determining
the allowable scope of future advance and all obligations clauses may be drawn from both
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standards to regulate secured creditor behavior in performing and en-
forcing security agreements. The doctrine has been used to regulate se-
cured creditor performance and enforcement under future advance
arrangements. 14 Moreover, as the doctrine of good faith is well-suited
to the regulation of principals in relational agency contracts, t 15 so the
doctrine is appropriate to regulate the behavior of secured creditors rely-
ing on broad future advance and all obligations clauses in relational se-
curity arrangements.
The language and legislative history of the Code's definition of good
faith raise serious questions about the propriety of using the doctrine to
regulate secured creditor behavior under Article Nine. The Code states,
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement," ' 16 but also states that "unless
the context otherwise requires. . . '[g]ood faith' means honesty in fact in
the conduct or transaction concerned."' 7 An earlier draft had added,
"Good faith includes observance by a person of the reasonable commer-
cial standards of any business or trade in which he is engaged." '" 8 How-
ever, on the request of the American Bar Association, the expansive
definition of good faith as commercial reasonableness was deleted, leav-
ing only the narrow, subjective definition. 1" 9 Certainly the current lan-
guage of the Code, read with this legislative history, at least suggests that
the drafters intended "bad faith" to be confined to "dishonesty." And if
"honesty" is given its generally accepted meaning, the Code's doctrine of
good faith as honesty, or bad faith as dishonesty, becomes practically
useless for regulating secured creditor behavior. Secured creditors may
be overreaching, abusive, oppressive, and heedless of the interests of third
parties and the public, but they are rarely dishonest in the generally ac-
"good faith purchase" and "good faith in enforcement" doctrines. In light of the Code's treat-
ment of the security agreement as a contract, this Article emphasizes good faith in
enforcement.
114. See supra note 11 & accompanying text.
115. E.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977)
(salesman's employment contract contained implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
which was violated by employer's discharge to avoid paying bonuses); Goetz & Scott, supra
note 101, at 1138-40.
116. U.C.C. § 1-203. This provision has remained the same at least since 1950. See id.
§ 1-203 (1950), reprinted in 10 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 69, at 69.
117. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
118. Id. § 1-201(18) (1950), reprinted in 10 U.C.C. DRAFTS, supra note 69, at 59.
119. For discussions of the legislative history, see Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance
and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
666, 673-74 (1963); Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 619,
623-26; Summers, supra note 113, at 207-10.
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cepted sense. 120 If the doctrine of good faith is to perform a regulative
function under Article Nine, "good faith" must be defined expansively
and objectively as, at least, commercial reasonableness and fair dealing.
The problems with the application of an expansive, objective stan-
dard of good faith to regulate secured creditor behavior under Article
Nine are not as great as they initially appear. The issue is merely one of
analytical categories, of rubrics or labels, not policy. The Code does not
intend to license all manner of abusive behavior, but, on the contrary,
intends that courts continue their traditional regulation of secured credi-
tors. The principal question is thus not whether but how the regulation
will be accomplished.
The courts can adequately regulate secured creditor behavior with-
out reliance upon the doctrine of good faith, but they cannot do so with-
out cost. For example, the courts can refuse to accept a secured
creditor's particularly outrageous claim that a specific obligation is se-
cured on the grounds that under the circumstances enforcement of the
security agreement as requested would violate public policy.' 21 They can
also apply the restrictive "same class-relatedness" rule of construction'
22
or otherwise engage in creative interpretation (or misinterpretation) to
find that the obligation in question was never intended to be secured.
What would be lost in abandoning good faith as a doctrinal category
would be doctrinal integrity and a fruitful connection with modem con-
tract law, a connection which would produce a better understanding and
a more precise analysis of the issues.
Fortunately, there is no need to resort to alternative doctrines, be-
cause the Code permits application of an expansive, objective standard of
good faith behavior to regulate secured creditor behavior under Article
Nine. Generally, the use of a broad conception of good faith is consistent
with the drafters' expressed intention "to make it possible for the law
embodied in [the Code] to be developed by the courts in the light of
unforeseen and new circumstances and practices."' 23 More particularly,
the Code's definition of good faith as "honesty" is a minimum and not a
120. It has, however, been suggested that "honesty" itself can be read to mean commercial
reasonableness and fair dealing. Gillette, supra note 119, at 621-22.
121. U.C.C. § 1-203 (non-Code validating and invalidating causes supplement the Code);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981) (contract term may be unenforceable
on grounds of public policy when interest in enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circum-
stances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms).
122. This Article argues that the "same class-relatedness" rule should not be applied
under the Code, see infra text accompanying notes 145-227, but that argument rests in part on
the assumption that the doctrine of good faith, defined expansively and objectively, may be
applied under Article Nine.
123. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 1.
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maximum standard. The Comments state that "'good faith' . . . means
at least [honesty],"'124 necessarily implying that the term may mean
more. "Good faith" may mean more not only where the Code specifi-
cally says so, as in the case of sales of goods by merchants, 25 but also
where "the context otherwise requires."'' 26 The regulation of secured
creditor behavior under Article Nine is one "context" which, as a matter
of policy, requires the duty of good faith in performance and enforce-
ment to mean not only honesty but also the observance of reasonable
commercial standards and fair dealing.
Another context requiring an expansive, objective definition of good
faith is the area of overlap between Code and non-Code law. The Code
specifically contemplates an accommodation between Code and non-
Code law where it authorizes, in section I-103127 and in the definitions of
both "agreement" 1 28 and "contract,"' 129 derivation of standards for regu-
lating contracting parties' behavior from non-Code law. Thus, at least in
Article Nine, when neither policy nor specific provisions direct other-
wise, the Code's obligation of good faith should be read together with
regulatory principles derived from general contract law.
General contract law embodies an expansive, objective definition of
"good faith," which becomes applicable to Article Nine. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts provides, "Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and en-
forcement."'' 30 The Comments explain that "[g]ood faith ... excludes a
variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 'bad faith' because
they violate community standards of decency, fairness or rea-
124. Id. § 1-201(19) (emphasis added).
125. Id. § 2-102(i)(b) (" 'Good faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.").
126. Id. § 1-201 (introductory phrase). For a discussion of the "context" qualification of
the U.C.C. definitions, see Summers, supra note 113, at 213-15.
127. U.C.C. § 1-103 provides in part: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law relative to... estoppel, fraud, misrep-
resentation, duress, coercion, mistake .... or other validating or invalidating cause shall sup-
plement its provisions." U.C.C. § 9-105(4) refers to Article One as the source of "general
definitions and principles of construction and interpretation applicable throughout [Article
Nine]." On U.C.C. § 1-103, see generally, Hillman, Construction of the Uniform Commercial
Code: U.C.C. Section 1-103 and Code Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COMI. L. REV. 655
(1977).
128. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) ("Whether an agreement has legal consequences is determined by
the provisions of [the Code], if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts (Section 1-103).").
129. Id. § 1-201(11) (" 'Contract' means the total legal obligation which results from the
parties' agreement as affected by [the Code] and any other applicable rules of law.").
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). If "fair dealing" is a re-
quirement separate from "good faith," it could be applied to Article Nine problems through




Some courts have read the Code's general obligation of good faith
expansively in Article Nine cases.132 For example, in Skeels v. Universal
C. T. Credit Corp., 33 a secured financer had led an automobile dealer to
believe that overdue notes would be renewed, but instead repossessed the
dealer's entire inventory without notice. The appellate court stated that
the jury could not easily avoid the conclusion that the financer had acted
in bad faith. Reading sections 1-103 (non-Code law supplements the
Code) and 1-203 (the Code's good faith requirement) together and apply-
ing them to Article Nine, the court stated that "[t]hese provisions super-
impose a general requirement of fundamental integrity in commercial
transactions regulated by the Code."'
34
"Good faith," defined expansively and objectively to include com-
mercial reasonableness and fair dealing, is not sufficiently definite stand-
ing alone to resolve individual cases. "Commercial reasonableness" and
"fair dealing" are themselves largely indeterminate, and must derive
meaning from the context in which they are applied.
Article Nine provides a source of meaning-or standards-of com-
mercial reasonableness, fair dealing, and, ultimately, good faith in at least
two ways. First, Article Nine regards the interests of the debtor's third-
party creditors and purchasers of the collateral as legitimate and entitled
to protection from secured creditor overreaching and abusive behavior.
The debtor's third-party creditors and purchasers may be viewed as
third-party maleficiaries of the debtor-secured creditor contract, since
one major purpose of a security agreement is to subordinate the interests
of these third parties to those of the secured creditor. Just as the general
law of contracts protects the interests of intended third-party benefi-
ciaries, 35 so the contract law of Article Nine should protect third-party
maleficiaries from abusive behavior.
Standards of commercial reasonableness, fair dealing, and good faith
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1981).
132. E.g., Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969); Limo Diamonds,
Inc. v. D'Oro by Christopher Michael, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); General Ins.
Co. of America v. Lowry, 412 F. Supp. 12 (S.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd, 570 F.2d 120 (6th Cir.
1978).
133. 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964).
134. Id. at 851.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302-315 (1981). The reference to in-
tended third-party beneficiaries is only to suggest very broadly that modem contract law pro-
tects the legitimate interests of nonparties intended to be directly affected by a contract, and
that protection of the legitimate interests of the debtor's subordinate third-party creditors from
the abusive actions of a primary secured party would be consistent with Article Nine's incor-
poration of contract law's regulative doctrines.
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may also be derived from Article Nine by regarding it as a system with
its own integrity and limits. Article Nine is designed to encourage the
regular extension of commercial credit on a secured basis by reducing
both costs and the secured creditor's risks. Thus a large core of commer-
cially legitimate transactions is authorized by Article Nine, and the se-
cured party may take many actions to ensure her priority. But Article
Nine is not a secured creditor's license to kill. Some actions by secured
creditors will be outside the statutory license granted by Article Nine,
and thus taken in "bad faith," because they are highly irregular commer-
cially, or procedurally bizarre, or are taken for questionable motives, as
well as being oppressive in their effects on the debtor or third parties.
Such extreme actions need not be countenanced to further the basic goals
of Article Nine. If allowed, they would have the counterproductive effect
of compromising the legitimacy of the whole system.
Finally, standards of commercial reasonableness, fair dealing, and
good faith may be drawn not only directly from Article Nine itself but
also from non-Code community standards of fairness. 136 The courts have
always had a residual power to redress the effects of a creditor's illegiti-
mate actions, and Article Nine expressly reserves that power by its refer-
ence to non-Code regulatory principles.
1 37
In sum, courts should regulate secured creditor behavior through
the enforcement of the Code's obligation of good faith in enforcement of
contracts. "Good faith" should be defined expansively and objectively to
include commercial reasonableness and fair dealing. Standards of com-
mercial reasonableness, fair dealing, and, ultimately, good faith are de-
rived partly from Article Nine itself, which recognizes as legitimate the
interests of the debtor's third party creditors and the interests of the pub-
lic in the integrity of the Article Nine system. Finally, courts retain
under the Code their traditional power to redress outrageous behavior by
secured creditors.
Conscionability
One commentator 38 has suggested that the doctrine of unconscion-
ability 139 that is stated in section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
136. Id. § 205 & comment a.
137. U.C.C. § 1-103 (non-Code regulatory principles supplement the Code); id. § 9-105(4)
(referring to Article One for principles of construction and interpretation).
138. Justice, supra note 2, at 905-06, 915.
139. The literature on unconscionability is extensive. The leading article is Leff, Uncon-
scionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (criti-




Code' 4° and section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts1 41
should be applied to regulate secured creditor behavior under Article
Nine. Although no provision in Article Nine specifically requires courts
to refuse enforcement of unconscionable security agreements, the provi-
sions authorizing derivation of regulatory standards from non-Code
law' 42 plainly allow application of the doctrine of unconscionability to
appropriate cases under Article Nine.
Broad future advance and all obligations clauses in commercial se-
curity agreements should only rarely be found unconscionable either on
their face or as applied in specific cases. The conclusion that a contrac-
tual provision is "unconscionable" usually follows from serious defects in
the bargaining process, leading to the formation of a contract with terms
which are substantively oppressive in their effect. 143 This situation is
usually not present in a commercial contract. Although a commercial
security agreement may be substantially adhesive, its terms are not for
that reason alone unconscionable. All obligations clauses are commer-
cially reasonable from the financer's point of view, are not unreasonable
from the standpoint of commercial debtors, and are generally validated
by Article Nine, consistent with its policy of encouraging the extension
of credit on a secured basis. An attempt at opportunistic exploitation of
such a general provision by a secured creditor should be restrained not
by declaring the clause unconscionable' 44 but by declaring the creditor's
action to be outside the reasonable expectations of the parties or in bad
faith.
140. U.C.C. § 2-302 (authorizing courts to refuse to enforce unconscionable terms or con-
tracts in transactions in goods).
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (court may refuse to enforce
unconscionable contract or term).
142. U.C.C. §§ 1-103, -201(3), (11).
143. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 com-
ments c & d (1981). See generally Leff, supra note 139.
144. Similarly, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981) should not be
used to restrain the secured creditor's attempted opportunistic exploitation of a broad future
advance or all obligations clause. Section 211(3) provides, "Where the other party has reason
to believe that the party manifesting such assent [to a standardized writing] would not do so if
he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."
Most general future advance and all obligations clauses are not unreasonable from the stand-
point of the business debtor, so the secured creditor ordinarily would not have a reason to
believe that the debtor would object to the clause. Section 211(3) has been examined and
criticized in Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 762-79 (1982).
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How Not To Do It: The "Same Class-Relatedness" Rule
Many courts, as we observed at the outset, 145 do not apply modem
interpretive and policing doctrines to determine the allowable scope of a
security agreement. Instead, they apply the "same class-relatedness"
rule: to be among obligations secured under a broad future advance or
all obligations clause, a future advance or other secondary obligation
must be of the same class as the primary obligation and so related to it
that the consent of the debtor to its inclusion as a secured obligation may
be inferred.
For several reasons, the "same class-relatedness" rule is an unsatis-
factory test of the allowable scope of a security agreement. The content
of the rule is hopelessly indeterminate. The rule is an empty container
into which the courts may pour as little or as much as they wish in indi-
vidual cases. What is meant by "class" of obligations? Is any difference,
however trivial, in form, purpose, or mode of incurrence between the
primary and secondary obligation sufficient to place the secondary obli-
gation in a different class from the primary, and is this sufficient to
render the secondary obligation unsecured? If some differences between
primary and secondary obligations are permitted without taking the sec-
ondary obligation outside the range of the security, how do we tell which
differences are permissible and which are not? Just what does it mean to
say that, to be secured, the secondary obligation must be "so related to
the original that consent to its inclusion as a secured obligation may be
inferred"? How related is that? Do we focus on the nature and degree of
relatedness between the primary and secondary obligations, or do we also
look at such factors as the commercial context in which the security
agreement was intended to operate, the process of bargaining, and the
reasonable expectations of the parties? What is the relationship between
the "same class" and "relatedness" components of the test? What if a
secondary obligation is closely related to the primary one, but of a differ-
ent "class"? Should we exclude from secured status secondary obliga-
tions which are for the same business purpose as, and thus closely related
to, the original secured obligation, but which are in a different form and
thus (perhaps) in a different class from the original?
Similarly, it is unclear whether the "same class-relatedness" rule is a
rule in aid of interpretation or a rule of construction which operates as a
rule of law' 46 severely restricting the allowable scope of security agree-
145. See supra notes 9-12 & accompanying text.
146. Some writers distinguish between interpretation, which is the process of ascertaining
the intent of the parties, and construction, which is the process of determining meaning in
order to give a particular legal effect to the language used. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 534
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ments. The indeterminate status of the "same class-relatedness" test as a
rule of interpretation or a rule of law has on occasion produced substan-
tial confusion. 147 For example, in denying a secured creditor's motion
for summary judgment on its claim that the debtor's secondary as well as
primary obligations were secured under a broad future advance clause, a
federal district court stated:
[The debtor] has created a material issue of fact as to whether all of the
advances were within the same class so that they could all be found to
have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties. Accord-
ingly, even if I were to find that the parties intended that future ad-
vances be covered by their agreement, [the secured party's] motion
must still be denied. 1
48
The court plainly regarded the "same class-relatedness" test as both a
rule of interpretation and a restrictive rule of law, which makes little
sense.
The application of the "same class-relatedness" test as a rule of
strict construction, that is, as a restrictive rule of law, is wholly inconsis-
tent with the purposes and language of the Code. 149 As a rule of strict
construction, the "same class-relatedness" test operates as an overly ex-
clusive rule of law which renders unsecured secondary obligations which
are fully legitimate under the Code. The basic purpose of Article Nine is
to encourage the extension of commercial credit by reducing transaction
costs and economic and legal risks, especially in long-term commercial
relationships. 150 Application of the "same class-relatedness" test in-
creases transaction costs by requiring new security agreements for each
transaction, and also increases the secured creditor's economic and legal
risk that secondary obligations will be unsecured. Thus, the text of the
Code and Comments implicitly rejects the "same class-relatedness" test
as a rule of strict construction. A security agreement is to be "effective
(1960); Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833
(1964). A rule of construction operates as a rule of law when it excludes specific interpreta-
tions or outcomes from judicial acceptance or validation.
147. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court indicated that the "same class-relatedness"
test was a rule of law restricting the allowable scope of a security agreement no matter how a
future advance clause in the agreement was drafted. Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647,
666, 566 P.2d 470, 482 (1977). Perplexed, a lower court in a later case ventured to conclude
that "the language of [a security agreement] is... relevant," Credit Alliance Corp. v. Amhoist
Credit Corp., 74 Or. App. 257, 264 n.3, 702 P.2d 1121, 1125 n.3 (1985), and that there was
evidence that the security agreements at issue were intended to secure the secondary as well as
the primary obligations of the debtor. Id. at 265, 702 P.2d at 1126. Although secured credi-
tors will be pleased to know that the language of a security agreement remains at least "rele-
vant" in Oregon, no one can be certain of the status of the "same class-relatedness" test.
148. Kitmitto v. First Pa. Bank, 518 F. Supp. 297, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
149. R. HILLMAN, supra note 2, § 21.01[3][a], at 21-9; Justice, supra note 2, at 903-05.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 32-39.
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according to its terms,"' 5' which are to be ascertained from the parties'
language and all other relevant circumstances,152 not simply by "class"
and "relatedness." Article Nine specifically permits and imposes no re-
strictions upon future advance, all obligations, and cross-security clauses
in commercial security agreements. 153 The Comments specifically reject
pre-Code rules designed to limit commercial security, a rejection which
plainly encompasses the restrictive "same class-relatedness" test.
The judicial popularity of the "same class-relatedness" rule of con-
struction is due in part to Professor Grant Gilmore, 154 who claimed that
the rule as stated by a federal district court purportedly applying Arkan-
sas lawl5 5 represented the "general" pre-Code law of future advance
clauses, 156 and who argued that the rule should continue to be applied
under the Code. 1
57
Although probably no one knew more about the evolution of the
common and statutory law of security interests in after-acquired personal
property than Professor Gilmore, he should not be taken as a pre-emi-
nent authority on the obligational component of secured transactions, a
much different subject. There is evidence that Professor Gilmore neither
studied independently nor thought deeply about the pre-Code case law of
future advances. For example, Professor Gilmore seems to have re-
garded the secured construction loan as the commercial transaction giv-
ing rise to most early-modem future advance clause problems.'
58
However, even a cursory review of the cases in a commercially important
jurisdiction such as New York reveals the use of future advance and all
obligations clauses in many types of commercial transactions, and a well-
151. U.C.C. § 9-201.
152. Id. § 1-201(3) (defining "agreement").
153. Id. § 9-201 (a security agreement is effective according to its terms); id. § 9-204(l) (all
obligations may be secured by after-acquired collateral); id. § 9-204(3) (secured obligations
may include future advances or other value).
154. R. HILLMAN, supra note 2, § 21.01[3][a], at 21-9 ("[O]ne reason for the [same class-
relatedness] rule's continued vitality is Gilmore's endorsement of it.").
155. National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aft'd sub nom.
National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960). The district court stated:
The other "indebtedness" secured by a mortgage may be either antecedent or
subsequent. Where it is antecedent, it must be identified in clear terms, and where it
is subsequent, it must be of the same class as the primary obligation secured by the
instrument and so related to it that the consent of the debtor to its inclusion may be
inferred.
Id. at 673.
156. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 35.2, at 921.
157. Id. § 35.5, at 932.
158. Id. § 35.3, at 925 ("The institutional transaction out of which future advance law
grew was the building construction loan."); see also id. at 922.
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developed pre-Code law on the subject.159 Furthermore, Professor Gil-
more's conclusion that the "same class-relatedness" rule of construction
was the "general" pre-Code law seems to have been derived not from his
own independent analysis of the pre-Code cases, but principally from a
1954 student law review note 160 in which analysis of restrictions on fu-
ture advance and all obligations clauses was based almost exclusively on
cases from Southern, Midwestern, and Western agricultural states.'
61
All of the accumulated evidence indicates that Professor Gilmore
was simply wrong in asserting that the "same class-relatedness" test was
anything other than a minority rule in pre-Code law. As noted above,'
62
even Professor Gilmore observed that future advance clauses received
relatively favorable treatment in pre-Code law,163 and at least two major
real property treatises stated that mortgages were liberally construed as
including future advances, 164 an approach which implicitly rejected the
"same class-relatedness" rule. A recent commentator examined many
pre-Code cases and concluded that "Gilmore overstated matters."'
65
For the purposes of this Article, I have chosen to examine the law of
New York, because it was the most significant commercial jurisdiction
before 1962, and of Arkansas, because it was apparently the birthplace of
the "same class-relatedness" test. A survey of the future advance law in
these states reveals that New York never adopted the "same class-relat-
edness" rule, and that the rule was being qualified in Arkansas as Gil-
more wrote. 166
159. See infra cases cited notes 168-74, 180 & 184-86 and text accompanying notes 167-86;
see also Comment, Priority of Future Advances Lending Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
35 U. CHI. L. REv. 128, 129-32 (1967).
160. Note, Refinements in Additional Advance Financing: The "Open End" Mortgage, 38
MINN. L. REv. 507, 511-15 (1954) (surveying cases and claiming that "the results seem to
indicate a general adherence" to the "same class-relatedness" rule of construction). The Note
was cited as one of the two "most useful" pre-Code articles on future advances. 2 G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 2, § 35.1, at 916 n.1.
161. Note, supra note 160, at 511-15. Twentieth-century cases cited were from the states
of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Vermont.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
163. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 35.3, at 921-22.
164. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 57, at 136 n.8; G. OSBORNE, supra note
57, at 184 n.7.
165. Justice, supra note 2, at 898.
166. Ideally, a complete study would be made of the evolution of each state's pre-Code law
of future advance and all obligations clauses against the changing economic background. Such
a complete study is beyond my resources, and most probably would merely confirm the con-
clusions reached in this Article.
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New York
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, New York, an influ-
ential, capital-rich, industrial state, has favored all obligations clauses
and interpreted them generously in favor of creditors. 167 In early New
York cases, unsecured and secondary secured creditors frequently chal-
lenged future advance clauses as fraudulent or as preferences invalid per
se. Such challenges were almost always unsuccessful, as courts regularly
upheld and enforced future advance and all obligations clauses in chattel
mortgages. 16 Early cases interpreted "future advance" or "all obliga-
tions" language liberally in favor of primary creditors. For example, in
Agawarn Bank v. Strever,169 a promissory demand note for $4000 was
pledged to secure "all liabilities incurred" by the principal debtor to the
bank. 170 The makers contended that the note secured only liabilities ex-
isting on the date of the pledge, but the appellate court approved the
admission and consideration of parol evidence that no liabilities existed
at the time the note was pledged, 17 and went on to hold as a matter of
law that the security of the note extended beyond the single sum of $4000
to secure as "a continuing guaranty" literally all liabilities of the princi-
pal debtor to the bank.1
72
The early New York cases were consolidated and the contours of
the modern New York law of future advance and all obligations clauses
were completed in the cases of Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 7 3 decided in
167. On future advances in New York, see S. EAGER, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORT-
GAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES AND TRUST RECEIPTS §§ 41, 42 (1941); Note, Mortgages to
Secure Future Advances, 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 340 (1934).
168. See, e.g., Brown v. Guthrie, 110 N.Y. 435, 18 N.E. 254 (1888); Knapp v. McGowan,
96 N.Y. 75 (1884); Miller v. Lockwood, 32 N.Y. 293 (1865); Youngs v. Wilson, 27 N.Y. 351
(1863); McKinster v. Babcock, 26 N.Y. 378 (1863); Fassett v. Smith, 23 N.Y. 252 (1861);
Robinson v. Williams, 22 N.Y. 380 (1860); Livingston v. M'Inlay, 16 Johns. 165 (N.Y. 1819);
Hall v. Crouse, 20 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 557 (1878); Ripley v. Larmouth, 56 Barb. 21 (N.Y. App. Div.
1865); Dart v. McAdam, 27 Barb. 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 1858); Bank of Utica v. Finch, 3 Barb.
Ch. 293 (N.Y. Ch. 1848); Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sand. Ch. 85 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); Brinkerhoff v.
Marvin, 5 Johns. Ch. 320 (N.Y. Ch. 1821); Fairbanks v. Bloomfield, 5 Duer 434 (N.Y. Super.
Ct. 1856); Wescott v. Gunn, 4 Duer 107 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1854); Carpenter v. Blote, 1 E.D.
Smith 491 (N.Y.C.P. 1852).
169. 18 N.Y. 502 (1859).
170. Id. at 508.
171. Id. at 509.
172. Id. at 510. Despite their liberal approach to future advance and all obligations
clauses, the New York courts occasionally found on the facts that no agreement covered the
particular advances in question. See, e.g., Davenport v. McChesney, 86 N.Y. 242 (1881);
Duncan v. Brennan, 83 N.Y. 487 (1881); Stoddard v. Hart, 23 N.Y. 556 (1861); Monnot v.
Ibert, 33 Barb. 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1859); Wyckoffv. Anthony, 90 N.Y. 442 (N.Y. C.P. 1882);
cf. Truscott v. King, 6 N.Y. 147 (1852).
173. 85 N.Y. 43 (1881).
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1881, and Gillet v. Bank of America,174 decided in 1899. In Ackerman,
the Court of Appeals recognized the commercial utility of continuing
security arrangements and broadly approved the use of future advance
clauses. 
175
The crucially important Gillet case defined limits on the application
of future advance and all obligations clauses in terms of commercial rea-
sonableness. The firm of Dan Talmadge & Sons had pledged certain
stock to the Bank of America to secure the payment of a $35,000 note
and any other present or future liabilities of the firm to the bank. 176 Af-
ter the firm defaulted on an unsecured promissory note payable to a life
insurance company, the bank bought the note from the insurance com-
pany and asserted that its security interest in the pledged collateral se-
cured the firm's payment of the purchased note now due to the bank.177
In a broad and surprisingly modem opinion, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the "all liabilities" clause in the original pledge agree-
ment did not extend the bank's security interest to secure payment of the
Talmadge firm's note which the bank had purchased from the life insur-
ance company. 178 Observing that the security agreement was a printed
form prepared by the bank,179 the court held that "the principle control-
ling as to the construction of insurance policies and other similar instru-
ments is applicable to this agreement, and that [the printed-form security
agreement] should be liberally construed in favor of the [debtors]." 180
The court examined the "circumstances and transactions existing be-
tween the parties" to define the relationship established between the bank
174. 160 N.Y. 549, 55 N.E. 292 (1899).
175. Ackerman, 85 N.Y. at 47; see supra text accompanying note 6.
176. Gillet, 160 N.Y. at 552, 55 N.E. at 292-93.
177. Id. at 554, 55 N.E. at 293.
178. Id. at 559, 55 N.E. at 295.
179. Id. at 552, 554, 55 N.E. at 292, 293.
180. Id. at 555, 55 N.E. at 293. The rule that a printed-form security instrument should
be strictly construed against the preparer quickly became accepted nationally. See, e.g., Hano-
ver Nat'l Bank v. Suddath, 215 U.S. 110 (1909) (language in printed-form pledge agreement
between correspondent banks strictly construed against secured party preparer); Heffner v.
First Nat'l Bank, 311 Pa. 29, 166 A. 370 (1933); Holston Nat'l Bank v. Wood, 125 Tenn. 6,
16, 140 S.W. 31, 34 (1911) ("[A stock pledge] agreement will not be construed so as to extend
the obligation beyond that intended by the pledgor; and, if such agreement is on a printed form
furnished by the bank and signed by its customer, and any doubt arises as to its proper inter-
pretation, it will be construed in favor of the customer."). The rule stated in Gillet is a lineal
antecedent of a modern rule of interpretation applied generally in contract law. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) ("[T]hat [reasonable] meaning [of a contract or
term] is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from
whom a writing otherwise proceeds."). It is significant that the adherents in Gillet and Sud-
dath were not consumers, but a business firm and a bank, respectively, with, it is reasonable to
assume, some sophistication.
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and the Talmadge firm, and concluded that the pledge "was intended to
secure the liabilities of the [debtors] to the bank arising out of the busi-
ness transactions or relations ... between them as bank and customer,
or which came into [the bank's] hands in the ordinary course of its bank-
ing business, whether past, present, or future."' 81 The court further ob-
served that the opposite construction would allow the bank to transfer all
the debtor's property within its reach to such of the debtor's creditors as
the bank might wish to prefer, at least to the extent of the bank's ability
to purchase the debtor's outstanding liabilities. 182 Such a construction
was to be resisted because it "would make the contract unreasonable, and
place one of the parties at the mercy of the other."'
' 83
The Ackerman-Gillet axis formed a modem relational law of all ob-
ligations clauses which has been consistently applied by the New York
courts throughout the twentieth century, both before and after the adop-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code. Following the early nineteenth
century tradition and Ackerman, the New York courts have consistently
read future advance and all obligations clauses expansively, repeatedly
extending the security of real and chattel mortgages and Article Nine
security agreements to cover particular obligations incurred after the
date of the original agreement. 84 On the other hand, when a creditor
claims that an all obligations clause extends to a particular debt arising
or acquired outside the ordinary course of dealing and the specific intent
of the parties cannot be precisely determined, the courts confine the orig-
inal security agreement to the commercially reasonable scope of the par-
ties' relationship under all the circumstances. 185 Of course, in a few
181. Gillet, 160 N.Y. at 556-57, 55 N.E. at 294.
182. Id. at 557, 55 N.E. at 294.
183. Id. at 557, 55 N.E. at 295.
184. See, e.g., In re Riss Tanning Corp., 468 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972) (under 1962 version
of U.C.C. adopted by N.Y., securing of chattel mortgage containing all obligations clause ex-
tended security to debt owed on real estate mortgage and bond); In re Chichanowicz, 226 F.
Supp. 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); In re Rosenblatt, 299 F. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1924); Angel v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 279 N.Y. 250, 18 N.E.2d 145 (1938); Hyman v. Hauff, 138 N.Y. 48, 33 N.E. 735
(1893); Farr v. Nichols, 13 N.Y. 543, 32 N.E.253 (1892); National Bank v. Shaad, 60 A.D.2d
774, 400 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1977) (all obligations clause operates to extend security interest in
travel lift to secure payment of checking account overdrafts); Huntington v. Kneeland, 102
A.D. 284, 92 N.Y.S. 944 (1905), affid mem., 187 N.Y. 563, 80 N.E. 1111 (1907); Commercial
Bank v. Weinberg, 77 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 597, 25 N.Y.S. 235 (1893).
185. Iser v. Herbert Mark Bldg. Corp., 253 N.Y. 499, 171 N.E. 757 (1930) (mortgage
assigned to creditor does not secure payment of mortgagor's previously unsecured debt owed
to creditor before mortgage assignment); Chemical Bank v. Puro, 106 Misc. 2d 363, 431
N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (stock pledged to secure payment of all liabilities of debtor
to Chemical Bank would not secure payment of previously unsecured obligation to Security
National Bank after banks merged); In re Tiffany Lingerie, Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 96, 208 N.Y.S.2d
741 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (proceeds of debtor's accounts receivable collected by factor under
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cases, neither the language of the security agreement nor the surrounding
circumstances support the creditor's claim that the security extends to a
particular secondary obligation.
186
One thing the New York courts have never done is apply the "same
class-relatedness" rule or anything remotely like it to interpret or con-
strue a future advance or all obligations clause in a security instrument.
The "same class-relatedness" rule is not, and never has been, a part of
the "general" law of New York.
Arkansas
Arkansas was the birthplace of the "same class-relatedness" test,
and for that reason its law of all obligations clauses is important.18 7 In
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Arkansas was a world away
from New York. As late as 1940, about eighty percent of Arkansas' pop-
ulation earned their living by agriculture. 188 The state was the second or
third largest producer of cotton in the United States during the 1930's
and cotton produced about half the state's cash farm income. 189 The
price of cotton reached a high in 1920, dropped and fluctuated in the
next decade, and collapsed in the 1930's,190 the heyday of the "same
class-relatedness" test in Arkansas.
The post-Civil War economic history of Arkansas, and the evolution
of the law of all obligations clauses, is divided into three overlapping
periods. The first is the period of the crop-lien system of agricultural
finance which extended from about 1870 until the 1930's. The second is
the period between the two world wars, from about 1920 to 1940, when
the Arkansas economy was in a state of instability leading to a collapse,
and when the state's commercial system was undergoing moderniza-
agreement cannot be applied to discharge debtor's unsecured third-party obligations which
factor purchased).
186. E.g., Scheurer v. Brown, 67 A.D. 587, 73 N.Y.S. 877 (1902); In re Bea Y Urquiza's
Estate, 124 Misc. 427, 208 N.Y.S. 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1924).
187. On all obligations clauses in modem Arkansas, see generally Meek, Mortgage Provi-
sions Extending the Lien to Future Advances and Antecedent Indebtedness, 26 ARK. L. REV.
423 (1973); Comment, The Extent of the Debts Secured by a Mortgage in Arkansas, 9 ARK. L.
REv. 45 (1954).
188. J. FLETCHER, ARKANSAS 336 (1947).
189. WRITERS' PROGRAM OF THE WORK PROJECTS ADMINISTRATION IN THE STATE OF
ARKANSAS, ARKANSAS 59 (1941).
190. 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 78, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1975). The approximate value of all farm prod-
ucts per farm in Arkansas fell from $1825 in 1919 to $988 in 1929, and to $581 in 1939. G.
FrTE, COTTON FIELDS No MORE app. at 237 (1984).
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tion.191 The third period is that after World War II when Arkansas
emerged as a part of the national economic system. I shall consider each
of these periods in turn.
The Arkansas law of all obligations clauses in security instruments
initially developed within the context of the crop-lien system of agricul-
tural finance in effect throughout the South from about 1870 into the
1930's. 192 Although there were many variations in this system of agricul-
tural credit, in general a merchant-factor 9 3 made an initial advance to
the farmer in the spring with the understanding that additional advances
might be necessary throughout the season to enable the farmer to harvest
the crop. To secure repayment, typically due in November, the farmer
mortgaged the crops to be grown (usually cotton and corn), draft ani-
mals, tools, and land. The mortgage, executed in the spring, ordinarily
contained a future advance or all obligations clause to secure repayment
of any future advance which might be made. Occasionally the mortgage
also secured, or was claimed to secure, pre-existing debts.
During the period of the crop-lien system, the Arkansas Supreme
Court resolved all obligations clause cases according to its understanding
of the commercial requirements and reasonable limits of the system of
nonbank agricultural credit. Many, and perhaps most, mortgages were
individually negotiated, as opposed to being merely adhered to by debt-
ors as in more recent credit systems. The starting point was the language
of the security instrument, interpreted in light of what parties at home in
the system would reasonably expect. The court regularly held that a
mortgage secured repayment of future advances incurred between the
parties in the ordinary course of business when the language of the secur-
ity instrument reasonably comprehended the debt in question. 194 In the
191. See generally G. WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH (1986) (dividing the economic
history of the post-Civil War South into these periods).
192. On the crop-lien system generally, see R. RANSOM & R. SUTCH, ONE KIND OF
FREEDOM 120-48 (1977); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 180-85
(1951); H. WOODMAN, KING COTTON AND HIS RETAINERS 295-314 (1968); Clark, The Fur-
nishing and Supply System in Southern Agriculture Since 1865, 12 J.S. HIST. 24 (1946); Ford,
Rednecks and Merchants: Economic Development and Social Tensions in the South Carolina
Upcountry, 1865-1900, 71 J. AM. HIST. 294 (1984); Parker, The South in the National Econ-
omy, 1865-1970, 46 S. ECON. J. 1024, 1032-38 (1980); Woodman, Post-Civil War Southern
Agriculture and the Law, 53 AGRIC. HIST. 319 (1979). The description of the crop-lien system
in this paragraph is abstracted from these works and from the Arkansas cases cited infra notes
194-97.
193. So far as observed, a bank was the lender in only one all obligations clause case
decided by an appellate court in Arkansas before 1920, Greeson v. German Nat'l Bank, 78
Ark. 141, 95 S.W. 439 (1906). The debtor was a lumber company.
194. See, e.g., Price v. Williams, 179 Ark. 12, 13 S.W.2d 822 (1929) (mortgage containing
future advance clause secured repayment of advances made to debtor by assignee of mortgage);
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absence of special circumstances, the obligations secured would be lim-
ited to those reasonably comprehended by the instrument, interpreted in
light of the general purpose of the transaction.195 In a precursor of the
"same class-relatedness" cases, one court held that an all obligations
clause in a chattel mortgage given to secure a crop loan did not secure
the debtor's payment of a third-party judgment which the mortgagee had
purchased at face value, because the mortgage was intended to secure
only indebtedness "of the same nature" as the original crop loan.196
New commercial institutions and practices appeared in Arkansas
between the wars. This period was, paradoxically, both a time-of transi-
tion to a modem commercial economy and a time of economic instability
and collapse. At the outset of the period, the Arkansas Supreme Court
demonstrated its hostility to modem commercial financing methods
when it plainly misinterpreted chattel mortgages given by an automobile
dealer to a bank in order to eliminate their cross-security provisions.
197
As the agricultural depression of the late 1920's deepened into the
Great Depression of the 1930's, the Arkansas Supreme Court con-
demned secured creditors who relied upon broad future advance and all
Thompson v. B.W. Reeves & Co., 170 Ark. 409, 279 S.W. 1011 (1926); Lines v. Brandon, 129
Ark. 27, 194 S.W. 867 (1917) (mortgage given by husband and wife to secure debts owed to
W.P. Brandon and J.D. Baugh also secured debts owed to partnership, Brandon, Baugh & Co.,
and secured advances after husband's death to enable the wife to gather the crop); Blackburn
v. Thompson, 127 Ark. 438, 193 S.W. 74 (1917); Hamilton v. Rhodes, 72 Ark. 625, 83 S.W.
351 (1904); Moore v. Terry, 66 Ark. 393, 50 S.W. 998 (1899); Curtis & Lane v. Flinn, 46 Ark.
70 (1885); Bell v. Radcliffe, 32 Ark. 645 (1878) (equity will extend security of mortgage to
secure repayment of advances beyond specific limitation in mortgage if necessary to carry out
the purpose of the mortgage); Jarret v. McDaniel, 32 Ark. 598 (1877). For a case holding an
antecedent debt to be secured under an "all indebtedness" clause in a livestock mortgage, see
Hoye v. Burford, 68 Ark. 256, 57 S.W. 795 (1900).
195. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Portis Mercantile Co., 196 Ark. 751, 119 S.W.2d 915 (1938);
Patterson v. Ogles, 152 Ark. 395, 238 S.W. 598 (1922); Morgan v. Mahoney, 124 Ark. 483,
187 S.W. 633 (1916); Howell v. Walker, 111 Ark. 362, 164 S.W. 746 (1914); Greeson v. Ger-
man Nat'l Bank, 78 Ark. 141, 85 S.W. 439 (1906); Cohn v. Hoffman, 56 Ark. 119, 19 S.W. 233
(1892); Hughes v. Johnson, 38 Ark. 285 (1885); Johnson & Goodrich v. Anderson, 30 Ark.
745 (1875).
196. Martin v. Holbrooks, 55 Ark. 569, 571, 18 S.W. 1046, 1046 (1892). The court added,
ambiguously, "If the mortgagees expected to acquire a right under the mortgage which was
not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of its execution, they should have employed
unambiguous language expressing that intention." Id. at 571, 18 S.W. at 1047; see also Lightle
v. Rotenberry, 166 Ark. 337, 266 S.W. 297 (1924) (mortgage to secure "all liabilities" of
debtor to bank did not secure previously unsecured note of debtor to third party acquired by
bank as collateral for third-party debt to bank).
197. Page v. American Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 167 Ark. 607, 269 S.W. 561
(1925). The Page case grew out of the failure of the Hollan Auto Company, a dealership in
Little Rock, financed by the American Bank of Commerce and Trust Company under a primi-
tive floor-planning arrangement and real property mortgage.
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obligations clauses in mortgages as "grasping and unconscionable."'' 9
The court labelled mortgages containing such clauses " 'Anaconda
mortgages' . . . as by their broad and general terms they enwrap the
unsuspecting debtor in the folds of indebtedness embraced and secured in
the mortgage which he did not contemplate .... " 199 In this context, the
"same class-relatedness" test was formulated and applied as a rule of
strict construction to limit the reach of secured creditors and to provide
some relief to debtors and secondary creditors. In the case of Hendrick-
son v. Farmers' Bank & Trust Co.,2°° the court, rejecting a claim that a
real estate mortgage with an all obligations clause secured an antecedent
debt, discovered that the "same class-relatedness" rule of construction
was derived from natural law:
[I]n order to extend the intention of the parties beyond the primary
purpose of the mortgage so as to secure the payment of debts other
than those specifically mentioned, from our decisions and principles of
natural justice the following rule may be deduced: Where a mortgage
is given to secure a specific debt named, the security will not be ex-
tended as to antecedent debts unless the instrument so provides and
identifies those intended to be secured in clear terms, and, to be ex-
tended to cover debts subsequently incurred, these must be of the same
class and so related to the primary debt secured that the assent of the
mortgagor will be inferred. The reason is that mortgages, by the use of
general terms, ought never to be so extended as to secure debts which
the debtor did not contemplate.20'
While relentlessly applying the "same class-relatedness" test to restrict
the claims of secured creditors against individual debtors and their third-
party creditors, 20 2 the Arkansas Supreme Court did recognize the legiti-
macy of future advance arrangements in purely commercial financing,
holding, for example, that a financing seller's subsequent advances to a
buyer were secured under a future advance clause in a real estate
mortgage. 20
3
In the most recent period of Arkansas economic history, which be-
gan at the end of World War II, conditions have generally been much
198. Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 377, 21 S.W.2d 419, 421 (1929) (real estate mortgage).
199. Id.
200. 189 Ark. 423, 73 S.W.2d 725 (1934).
201. Id. at 433, 73 S.W.2d at 729.
202. E.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 184 Ark. 689, 43 S.W.2d 248
(1931) (future advance clause in mortgage given to secure repayment of loan for purchase of
business did not extend security of mortgage to later small loans unconnected with original
transaction); Berger v. Fuller, 180 Ark. 372, 21 S.W.2d 419 (1929) (debtor's unsecured obliga-
tions did not become secured under all obligations clause in third-party mortgage when credi-
tor took mortgage by assignment).
203. State Nat'l Bank v. Temple Cotton Oil Co., 185 Ark. 1011, 50 S.W.2d 980 (1932); see
G. FITE, supra note 190, at 181-83, 207; Parker, supra note 192, at 1045-46.
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better than in the 1930's, and the state has joined the mainstream of the
American commercial and legal system. Under these circumstances, the
economic emergency having passed, the Arkansas Supreme Court no
longer applies the "same class-relatedness" rule strictly. Rather, the
court applies the test differentially. Sometimes the court relies upon it
directly in restricting the extension of a security interest.2°4 At other
times the court appears to ignore or at least not to rely upon the test in
upholding the extension of a security interest to cover particular ad-
vances.205 One interpretation of the modem Arkansas future advance
cases is that the supreme court uses the "same class-relatedness" test
only to justify the restriction of a security interest, and that the test is not
a test at all but simply a sign of a conclusion reached on other grounds.
Perhaps a better interpretation is that the court no longer applies the old
test as a legal standard controlling decisions, but regards it as highlight-
ig important factors to be considered in resolving difficult future ad-
vance cases in a modem commercial context. 20 6 On balance, it appears
that during the modem period Arkansas has returned to its approach
under the old crop-lien system: regardless of doctrinal formulations, the
Arkansas Supreme Court resolves all obligations clause cases according
to its understanding of the requirements and reasonable limits of the ex-
isting commercial system, viewed in light of the particular circumstances
of each case.
While the Arkansas Supreme Court was abandoning the strict
"same class-relatedness" test in the post-World War II period, the fed-
eral courts in Arkansas were continuing to apply it.2o7 In National Bank
v. Blankenship,20 8 the case upon which Professor Gilmore relied in rec-
204. Security Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 263 Ark. 525, 565 S.W.2d 623 (1978) (husband
and wife's residential purchase money mortgage containing all obligations clause did not se-
cure husband's business indebtedness); Jacobs v. City Nat'l Bank, 229 Ark. 79, 313 S.W.2d 789
(1958) (same).
205. Associated Business Inv. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 264 Ark. 611, 573 S.W.2d 328
(1978); Bleidt v. 555, Inc., 253 Ark. 766, 489 S.W.2d 235 (1973); Alston v. Bitely, 252 Ark. 79,
477 S.W.2d 446 (1972); Curry v. Commercial Loan & Trust Co., 241 Ark. 419, 407 S.W.2d
942 (1966); Benton State Bank v. Reed, 240 Ark. 704, 401 S.W.2d 738 (1966); Tolson v. Pyra-
mid Life Ins. Co., 221 Ark. 492, 254 S.W.2d 53 (1953); Holt v. Gregory, 219 Ark. 798, 244
S.W.2d 951 (1952).
206. Surveying previous future advance cases in 1966, the court stated, "Actually, the
result in the cases seems to depend upon the particular facts and circumstances." Benton State
Bank v. Reed, 240 Ark. 704, 706-07, 401 S.W.2d 738, 739 (1966).
207. See, e.g., Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. North Arkansas Milling Co., 205 F. Supp.
524 (W.D. Ark. 1961).
208. 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ark. 1959), afl'd sub nom. National Bank v. General Mills,
Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960).
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ommending the "same class-relatedness" test,20 9 the debtor, who oper-
ated a poultry business, received three loans from the bank, each of
which was specifically secured by a separate real estate mortgage contain-
ing a broad all obligations clause. One mortgage was on the debtor's
store, a second on his farm, and a third on his home. The primary issue,
litigated by the bank and the debtor's secondary creditors after his bank-
ruptcy, was whether the all obligations clauses extended the security of
each mortgage to all the debtor's other obligations to the bank. Survey-
ing the old Arkansas cases, the federal district court restated the "same
class-relatedness" test.2 10 Specifically relying upon a 1925 case in which
the Arkansas Supreme Court plainly misinterpreted auto dealer-bank se-
curity instruments to eliminate their cross-security features, 2 1' the court
found that each mortgage was separate and independent, and not in-
tended to secure those debts for which other mortgages had been specifi-
cally given despite the fact that all these loans were for the "general
business welfare" of the debtor.2 12  Similarly, it did not matter that the
debtor understood that all of his property was subject to a lien for every-
thing he owed the bank2 13-an understanding which plainly took him
out of the category of unsuspecting debtors for whose protection the
"same class-relatedness" rule had supposedly been created. On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit found the Arkansas law on antecedent debts and fu-
ture advances to be "in doubt, ' 2 14 but nevertheless declined to disturb
the district court's statement of Arkansas law,21 5 and affirmed the
decision.
216
Since the Arkansas Supreme Court has retreated from a strict use of
the "same class-relatedness" test, it is doubtful that Blankenship retains
any vitality in Arkansas. The state supreme court, so far as has been
observed, has never cited the case. Even the federal district court distin-
guished Blankenship and refused to apply the "same class-relatedness"
test in an Arkansas case involving a detailed future advance clause.
21 7
209. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 35.2, at 920, § 35.5, at 932.
210. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. at 673; see supra note 155.
211. Page v. American Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 167 Ark. 607, 269 S.W. 561
(1925); see supra note 197 & accompanying text.
212. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. at 674.
213. Id. at 675.
214. National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574, 578 (8th Cir. 1960).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 580.
217. In re Dorsey Elec. Supply Co., 344 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (when future
advance clause is detailed and specific, "same class-relatedness" test does not apply).
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In short, this survey of both New York and Arkansas law yields
little support for Professor Gilmore's contention that the strict "same
class-relatedness" rule of construction represented the "general" pre-
Code law of future advance and all obligations clauses. The test was
born in Arkansas under conditions of economic instability and wide-
spread suffering, and was designed to protect debtors and partially equal-
ize losses among creditors. Once the economic emergency had passed
and Arkansas' economy had matured, the state abandoned the strict test
and moved toward a standard of commercial reasonableness. New York,
a far more important jurisdiction commercially, always applied a stan-
dard of commercial reasonableness and never applied rules of strict con-
struction to determine the allowable scope of a future advance or all
obligations clause.
Apart from the influence of Professor Gilmore, and despite its mani-
fest deficiencies as a legal rule, the strict "same class-relatedness" test
apparently retains much of its strength nationally because it provides a
mechanism for limiting the priority claims of primary secured creditors
while leaving the heart of the Article Nine system intact.218 Professor
Gilmore himself always thought that the Code went too far in favoring
secured creditors, and his advocacy of the restrictive "same class-related-
ness" rule of construction is consistent with his general position. 219 Simi-
larly, courts which are reluctant to grant all of a failed debtor's assets to
the primary secured creditor can apply the "same class-relatedness" rule
to eliminate some or all of the secured creditor's priority claims in favor
of interests securing secondary obligations. For example, in the case of
In re Eshleman,220 a bank first made a secured purchase money loan to a
debtor for an automobile and later made him a loan for business pur-
218. Cf R. HILLMAN, supra note 2, § 21.01[3][a], at 21-9 n.24 ("The courts may use [the
same class rule], not strictly as an interpretive aid, but as a weapon to guard against overreach-
ing by savvy creditors in cases involving unsophisticated debtors.") These commentators are
correct as far as they go, but their statement is too narrow: the courts use the "same class-
relatedness" rule to reorder priorities as well as to protect unsophisticated debtors.
219. In 1954, Professor Gilmore told the New York Law Revision Commission that "on
grounds of policy" he was "inclined" to choose "a rule under which no after-acquired property
interest, no floating charge of any sort would be recognized." 2 NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE
LAW REVISION COMMISSION AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE FOR 1954, at 1180 (Legis. Doc. No. 65, 1954) (statement of Grant Gilmore). In 1981,
Professor Gilmore argued that assignees of accounts receivable should be required to police
their collateral, and that primary secured creditors should not be allowed to take all the
debtor's after-acquired property after standing by while the debtor failed. Gilmore, Good
Faith Purchase, supra note 31, at 627.
220. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 750 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1972).
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poses.221 When the debtor went bankrupt, the bank claimed that the
relatively large amount remaining due on the business loan was secured
by the perfected security interest in the car under the future advance
clause in the original security agreement.222 The bankruptcy referee
would have none of this. He held that the business loan "was so unre-
lated to the earlier [automobile purchase money] loan transaction ... as
to negate the inference that the debtor consented to its inclusion" as an
obligation secured by the car, notwithstanding the breadth of the original
security agreement's future advance clause. 223 Aware that the "related-
ness" test was less an aid to discovering the debtor's intention than a
restrictive rule of law, the referee explained:
It seems wholly unjust and outrageous for a court of equity, such
as a bankruptcy court, where the interests of so many other creditors
are concerned in the outcome of a question such as the one before us,
to permit the bank to couple to a small remaining balance on an earlier
loan a wholly unrelated indebtedness over six times its size and defeat
what appears to be a source of funds for general creditors. In our view
this would be an impermissible extension of a future advance clause
authorized by... the Code.
2 2 4
Although the result in Eshleman may have been consistent with the
parties' reasonable expectations, the court acted improperly to the extent
that it used the "same class-relatedness" test to substitute its particular
judgment as to the fair and proper distribution of the debtor's assets for
that of the state legislature and Congress. Although the systemic as-
sumptions and wisdom of the legislature and of Congress are open to
question, it is improper for courts to invoke the "same class-relatedness"
rule of construction to revise national policy under the pretense of inter-
preting agreements. 225
The judicial use of the "same class-relatedness" rule of strict con-
struction is not only wrong in principle, but may also be counterproduc-
tive in the long run. Secured creditors who wish to be able to continue to
establish long-term and multifaceted security arrangements with their
221. Id. at 751.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 753.
224. Id.
225. Cf D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 8 (1984):
Bankruptcy judges, we believe, have no business to compromise the rights of secured
creditors in the interests of being "fair." They frequently fail to recognize that while
the value of secured credit is a debatable question, it is not a debatable bankruptcy




debtor customers may prevail upon the legislature to revise the rule.
This appears to have happened in Tennessee, where in 1983 the legisla-
ture specifically abolished the "same class-relatedness" rule and provided
that any written security agreement containing a future advance clause
"shall be deemed to evidence the true intentions of the parties, and shall
be enforced as written. ' 226 Although the statute contains a clause saving
other statutory and common-law contract defenses,227 this legislative
cure for judicial misconstruction may in the end prove worse for consum-
ers and small secondary creditors than a straightforward judicial ap-
proach to interpretation, unencumbered by either artificially restrictive
rules or legislative mandates.
In sum, the "same class-relatedness" rule should be rejected as a test
of the allowable scope of future advance and all obligations clauses in
security agreements under Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The rule is indeterminate in content and status and produces con-
fusion. As a rule of strict construction, the "same class-relatedness" test
is inconsistent with the policy and language of the Code. Professor Gil-
more's claim that the "same class-relatedness" rule of construction was
the "general" pre-Code law of future advance and all obligations clauses
is probably wrong. The use of the rule by courts to reorder legislative
priorities in the distribution of failed debtors' assets is an improper sub-
stitution of judicial for legislative judgment, and can lead to an unfortu-
nate legislative counterattack.
Rejection of the "same class-relatedness" rule will not make the ju-
dicial task any easier in future advance and all obligations clause cases.
Indeed, application of the "objectively reasonable expectations" test as
the principal interpretive standard of adhesive agreements, and of the
"good faith" and "conscionability" rules as the principal regulative stan-
dards, often depends upon close inquiry into facts and circumstances and
the careful weighing of many factors. We turn now to explore some of
the problems likely to be encountered.
Test Cases
There are no fully typical or paradigmatic problems involving sec-
ondary obligations of debtors to secured creditors because such problems
arise on the variegated periphery of commercial security arrangements.
The best that can be done is to survey some problems which have arisen
and suggest how modern contract law, adapted as necessary to the con-
226. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-112(b) (1984).
227. Id.
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text of Article Nine, might approach their resolution. Because all mod-
ern contract cases, including those under Article Nine, are highly fact-
specific, we should be wary of mechanical tests which offer certain and
principled resolution of all problems of a particular type.
The following discussion is organized into problems arising princi-
pally from the wording of the security agreement, parol evidence and
interpretation, the nature and timing of secondary obligations, and credi-
tor assignees. Of course, none of these areas is wholly separate from all
the others.
The Wording of the Security Agreement
Omnibus Clauses
One of the baleful effects of the application of the "same class-relat-
edness" rule of strict construction has been the proliferation of omnibus
all obligations clauses in which the secured creditor's form lists nearly
every type of legally enforceable obligation known to man. For example,
instead of the simple statement, "This security interest secures all obliga-
tions of the debtor to the creditor," one bankers' form book suggests that
a security agreement define the debtor's "liabilities" which are secured as
follows:
The term "Liabilities" shall include the liability evidenced by this
note and any and all other of Borrower's liabilities, direct or indirect,
absolute or contingent, secured or unsecured, joint, several, or in-
dependent, now or hereafter existing, due or to become due to, or held
or to be held by, the Bank for its own account or as agent for another
or others, whether created directly or acquired by assignment or
otherwise.
22 s
Professor Gilmore is at least partly responsible for this drafting ele-
phantitis. Apparently believing that the brief and simple was obscure
and misleading, he suggested that the more accurately contemplated
transactions were described in the security agreement, the less likely fu-
ture advances would be held unsecured through application of the "same
class-relatedness" test.
229
At least in the modern commercial context, Professor Gilmore's as-
sumption that the brief and simple is obscure seems erroneous. The plain
English movement is surely right that the short and simple is more read-
228. 10 J. REITMAN, H. WEISBLA-TT, J. COOPER, C. SILVER & H. SHAPIRO, BANKING
LAW § 251.02[16], 3(a) (1981) [hereinafter cited as J. REITMAN]. Actually, the quoted
clause is one of the shorter and clearer clauses recommended. See id. § 257.04[4].
229. 2. G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 35.5, at 932-33.
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ily comprehended than the long and complex.230 Moreover, from the
standpoint of the adherent-debtor who signs a standard-form contract,
the problem is that he either does not read or does not fully comprehend
any clause which is not immediately important. The very length of an
omnibus clause may deter even a conscientious debtor from attempting
to understand it. Whatever an omnibus clause gains in conspicuousness
and specificity due to its length is surely lost to the debtor in the fog of
words.
The problem of interpreting and policing omnibus clauses is basi-
cally the same as the problem encountered with shorter, simpler all obli-
gations clauses. Since a security agreement establishing a flexible, long-
term debtor-creditor relationship is relational, and the precise nature of
future secured obligations is unknown at the outset, the list of all types of
possible obligations which may arise in the future provides only a spe-
cious specificity. An omnibus clause moves the level of generality to a
slightly lower plane, but the central problem remains the possibility of
the secured creditor's opportunistic exploitation of the general clause in
particular circumstances.
Consider the following example. Mary borrows considerable sums
from the bank to open a boutique, signing a blanket security agreement
containing the omnibus clause quoted above.231 As part of her original
financing, Mary also borrows a substantial sum from her aging, sick un-
cle, giving him an unsecured promissory note. As he advances in age, the
uncle creates a trust for his grandchildren, with the bank as trustee, and
with Mary's unsecured promissory note as part of the corpus. When
Mary fails to pay the uncle's note, the bank claims that the note is now
secured by her business assets under the clause in the security agreement
which secures liabilities "to be held by the Bank ... as agent for an-
other. '232 The effect of upholding the bank's claim would be to give the
trust beneficiaries a windfall priority claim to Mary's business assets, pos-
sibly at the expense of her third-party creditors.
The bank's claim that Mary's previously unsecured promissory note
230. E.g., Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 727, 727-29 (1978).
David Melinkoff has written:
With communication the object, the principle of simplicity would dictate that the
language used by lawyers agree with the common speech, unless there are reasons for
a difference. .. . If there is no reason for departure from the language of common
understanding, the special usage is suspect. If, in addition, a special usage works evil,
it should be abandoned, and quickly.
D. MELINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW at vii (1963).
231. See supra text accompanying note 228.
232. Id.
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is now secured should be rejected. Although the trust corpus including
the promissory note was acquired in the ordinary course of the bank's
business, it was not acquired in the ordinary course of the bank's specific
business with Mary. The securing of the promissory note under these
circumstances is outside the objectively reasonable expectations of the
parties as to the scope of their future relationship. Mary could not have
agreed to let the bank exploit its position as provider of banking services
to the general community to alter disadvantageously her previous financ-
ing arrangements. Similarly, to the extent that "good faith" standards of
community decency and fairness contemplate protection of the debtor's
third-party creditors, the bank may be said to be acting in bad faith when
it effectively gives the trust beneficiaries a windfall at the expense of
Mary's employees and trade creditors. Neither commercial law gener-
ally nor the Article Nine system in particular favors windfall gains and
unwarranted forfeitures.
Bad Drafting
Even a form can be badly drafted. When a standard-form security
agreement does not clearly state that future advances or other secondary
obligations are to be secured, the court should apply the usual rule that a
written agreement should be construed against the drafter 33 and confine
the security to the obligations specifically identified as secured. For ex-
ample, in Texas Kenworth Co. v. First National Bank,2 34 each of four
security agreements specifically secured the payment of the purchase
price of each of four trucks. The only clue that the agreements were
intended to secure other obligations was in a clause providing that the
creditor would retain title to the trucks until the purchase price and re-
lated charges "and all other indebtedness from Buyer to Secured Party
[was] fully paid. 12 35 The court properly found that the language of the
title retention clause was insufficient to extend the security beyond the
purchase price and related charges for each truck.
2 36
Of course, if a printed-form security agreement has boxes to be
checked, the box by a future advance or all obligations clause must be
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (reasonable meaning which
operates against drafter generally preferred); see supra note 180 (discussion of the origins of
section 206); supra text accompanying notes 176-83 (discussion of Gillet v. Bank of America).
Application of this general rule to security agreements under Article Nine is authorized by
U.C.C. sections 1-103 (principles of law and equity supplement the Code), 1-201(3) (definition
of "agreement"), and 1-201(11) (definition of "contract").
234. 564 P.2d 222 (Okla. 1977).
235. Id. at 225.
236. Id. at 225-26.
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checked to extend the security beyond the obligations specifically identi-
fied as secured.
237
Parol Evidence and Interpretation
The parol evidence rule and its surrounding territory are among the
most unsettled and confusing areas of modem contract law.238 The con-
fusion arises in part from the overlap of two separate problems: deter-
mining what constitutes the agreement to be interpreted (the true parol
evidence rule problem), and determining the meaning of whatever is
found to constitute the agreement. Difficulties arise in part from the fact
that a court often must interpret the parties' language to determine what
constitutes the contract, and then may exclude evidence inconsistent
with the contract as found. If a court can do all that, it would seem (at
least to the judiciary) that a court can determine the "plain meaning" of
a written contract, and exclude evidence inconsistent with that meaning.
Commercial security agreements under Article Nine only rarely
raise true parol evidence rule problems.239 Partly through prudence and
partly to comply with Article Nine's writing requirement,24° the parties
customarily place all the terms of the basic security agreement in a single
document. Even when, through oversight, the terms of a security agree-
ment are not embodied in a single writing, conflicts rarely arise over what
constitutes the agreement itself. Multiple documents or multiple written
security agreements are usually consistent and cumulative rather than
conflicting. 24'
237. In re Grizafli, 23 Bankr. 137 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982).
238. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 3-1 to -15 (2d ed. 1977);
Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342 (1975).
239. Article Nine contains no parol evidence rule. The definitional fabric of the Code does
not lead from Article Nine into the parol evidence rule of Article Two, U.C.C. § 2-202. The
common-law parol evidence rule applies to security agreements under Article Nine through
U.C.C. § 1-103. True parol evidence rule problems occasionally do arise under Article Nine.
For example, in Kitmitto v. First Pa. Bank, 518 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1981), there was a
secondary issue as to whether a written pledge agreement was completely integrated or
whether additional terms were contained in other documents. Id. at 299 n.2. Since the terms
of the documents did not conflict, the central issue was interpretation. For an example from
non-Code law, see Estes v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 462 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1970) (court excluded
evidence of oral agreement that written deed of trust containing an all obligations clause would
secure only the primary obligation).
240. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a) (when the secured creditor does not have possession of the col-
lateral, the security agreement, to attach and be enforceable, must be in a writing or writings
meeting certain formal requirements).
241. E.g., In re Bollinger Corp., 614 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980) (statute of frauds met in the
absence of a single written security agreement, when a financing statement, promissory note,
and a course of dealing all indicated an intent to create a security interest).
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A few cases, however, have raised what might be called psuedo-pa-
rol evidence rule problems. As in most cases discussed in this Article, a
professional lender has extended credit on a secured basis, and a small
business debtor has executed a printed standard-form security agreement
containing an all obligations clause. However, unlike the typical case
where there is no evidence as to whether the debtor read or understood
the clause, the debtor in these cases admits having read the clause, but
claims to have understood it to exclude certain secondary obligations.
For example, in Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National Bank 242 three
security agreements between a private lender and a business debtor con-
tained all obligations clauses. Resisting the extension of the security in-
terests to secure secondary obligations, the debtor offered evidence of his
uncommunicated subjective intent at the time he executed the original
agreements. 243 The court excluded the offered evidence as "a classic vio-
lation of the parol evidence rule and clearly inadmissible," holding that
the "language of the contract, unless ambiguous, represents the intention
of the parties. ' '24
4
Although the court reached the correct result in Kimbell Foods,
holding the secondary obligations to be secured, its invocation of the pa-
rol evidence rule to exclude evidence of the debtor's subjective intent
was analytically unsound. The case presented no true parol evidence
problem because all agreed that the writings constituted the complete
and exclusive security agreements.2 45 The basic issue was the interpreta-
tion-not the content-of the all obligations clauses in the written
agreements.
Under the Code, all evidence relevant to the determination of the
parties' meaning or intention should be admissible. The parties' "bargain
in fact" is to be determined from all "relevant circumstances, 2 46 which
include the subjective intent of one party. Moreover, according to the
Comments, Article Nine, following pre-Code law, allows a debtor to
show by parol evidence that a conveyance absolute on its face was in-
tended for security,247 and it necessarily follows that either party could
introduce parol evidence as to which of the debtor's obligations were in-
tended to be secured. It would be consistent with this approach to allow
242. 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), affid on other grounds sub nor. United States v. Kim-
bell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
243. Id. at 495 & n.7.
244. Id. at 496.
245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213(2) (1981) (parol evidence rule);
cf U.C.C. § 2-202 (parol evidence rule in sales contracts).
246. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
247. Id. § 9-203 comment 4.
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a debtor to introduce parol evidence to show that a written security
agreement containing an all obligations clause was not intended by him
to extend to some types of obligations.
The Nature and Timing of Secondary Obligations
Secondary obligations of the debtor to the creditor often arise at a
time different from that of the primary obligation. These secondary obli-
gations are often different in nature from the primary obligation. The
determination of whether a particular secondary obligation is within the
allowable scope of the security agreement cannot be made through the
application of mechanical tests, but only through a determination of the
objectively reasonable expectations of the parties. In addition, the se-
cured creditors should be held to the duty of good faith. Both the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties and the content of the duty of good
faith are highly fact-specific. With that caveat in mind, I shall briefly
discuss particular types of secondary obligations which raise problems.
Antecedent Debts
As the Arkansas Supreme Court was formulating the strict "same
class-relatedness" rule of construction, it laid down even more severe re-
strictions on the conditions under which a security instrument could op-
erate to secure an existing unsecured debt: "[W]here a mortgage is given
to secure a specific debt named, the security will not be extended as to
antecedent debts unless the instrument so provides and identifies those
intended to be secured in clear terms ... ."248 The rule was restated by
the federal district court in National Bank v. Blankenship,249 and was
claimed by Professor Gilmore to be part of the "general" pre-Code
law25 0 which he argued should continue to be applied under the Code.251
Just as the restrictive "same class-relatedness" rule is inconsistent
with the Code, so the requirement that the security agreement specifi-
cally identify antecedent debts is not justified by Article Nine. The Code
allows antecedent debts to be among those obligations secured,252 and
248. Hendrickson v. Farmers' Bank & Trust Co., 189 Ark. 423, 433, 73 S.W.2d 725, 729
(1934).
249. 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959), afJ'd sub nom. National Bank v. General
Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960). See supra notes 208-17 & accompanying text.
250. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 35.2, at 921.
251. Id. § 35.5, at 932.
252. U.C.C. § 9-204(3) ("Obligations covered by a security agreement may include future
advances or other value .... ) (emphasis added); id. § 1-201(44)(b)("[A] person gives 'value'
for rights if he acquires them... as security for ... a pre-existing claim ....").
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there is no stated requirement that such debts be specifically identified.2 53
At least when the secured creditor is a professional financer lending
relatively large sums against a large portion of a commercial debtor's
assets, it is not unreasonable for the financer to expect that outstanding
unsecured debts be secured along with the primary secured obligations.
The debtor, on reflection, should not be surprised at the lender's wish to
be fully secured.254 In other situations, however, determination of the
parties' objectively reasonable expectations may be more difficult.
Separate Loans for Personal and Business Purposes
A professional lender may make separate loans to a small business
person for either personal or business purposes. A problem arises when
the lender claims that an all obligations clause in one security agreement
extends the security interest to secure repayment of another loan made
for a different purpose. Many variations on this problem are possible.
Either the business loan or the personal loan may be first in time, and the
agreement securing the repayment of either loan may contain the all obli-
gations clause claimed to extend the security of that agreement to the
other loan. Application of the "same class-relatedness" rule in such
cases will usually result in a holding that the secondary obligation is of a
different class than the primary, and is therefore not secured by operation
of the primary security agreement's all obligations clause. 25
5
The problem raised by the claimed extension of an interest securing
a primary loan to secure a loan for a different purpose admits to no gen-
eral solution. When the loan is a substantial one for business purposes
and the financer takes a security interest in a substantial part of the
debtor's business assets under a security agreement containing an all obli-
gations clause, the financer has probably made a policy decision to pro-
ceed with the individual debtor only on a comprehensively secured basis.
Both the debtor and even moderately sophisticated third-party creditors
should understand that, in extending credit for several different purposes,
253. Id. § 9-201 (a security agreement is "effective according to its terms"); cf id. § 9-
203(1)(a) (stating minimal formal requirements for the attachment and enforceability of a se-
curity agreement).
254. See Marine Nat'l Bank v. Airco, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (antecedent
debts were secured by operation of all obligations clauses in subsequent security agreements
when all loans were for working capital for business debtor); Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 254
Ga. 615, 331 S.E.2d 589 (1985) (antecedent debt of principal debtor to bank secured by opera-
tion of all obligations clause in surety's security agreement with bank).
255. E.g., In re Blair, 26 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (secondary business loan
not secured by operation of all obligations clause in security agreement to secure repayment of
personal obligations).
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the financer is relying in part on the comprehensive scope of his security
interest.
But when the primary secured loan is for personal purposes, for ex-
ample, a purchase money loan for an automobile, and the second, other-
wise unsecured loan is for business purposes, the lender and the borrower
are likely to have differing expectations, neither of which is unreasonable.
The lender, through use of the all obligations clause in the personal loan,
has made a policy decision to proceed only on a comprehensively secured
basis, and has probably failed to secure or perfect the business loan sepa-
rately only through oversight. The borrower, on the other hand, may
reasonably regard his personal accounts as separate from his business,
256
and expect the bank to recognize the division. Faced with an absence of
direct evidence which would tip the scales, a court may find the bank's
position slightly stronger. Certainly such a conclusion would be consis-
tent with the Code's broad purpose to reduce secured creditors' risks. It
may be instructive that when the Tennessee bankruptcy courts consist-
ently favored debtors and third-party creditors against lending banks in
such cases, 257 the Tennessee legislature effectively overruled them by de-
claring that a security agreement containing an all obligations clause
should be enforced "as written.
' '258
Debtor's Obligation to Pay for Creditor's Services
When a professional financer lends a business debtor relatively large
sums against a substantial portion of the debtor's business assets under a
security agreement containing an all obligations clause, both the financer
and the debtor should reasonably expect the security interest to secure
the debtor's obligations to pay for future services extended to the
debtor.259 Thus, despite a significant case to the contrary,260 a debtor's
obligation to repay a checking account overdraft should ordinarily be
secured under a debtor-bank security agreement which contains an all
obligations clause.261 Similarly, a pre-Code case which held that the se-
256. Article Nine distinguishes between security interests in consumer goods and those in
other collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-109. For example, Article Nine limits the extent to which a
creditor may take a security interest in after-acquired consumer goods. Id. § 9-204(2).
257. See supra note 16 & accompanying text.
258. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-50-112(b) (1984).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 101, 106-07.
260. Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 566 P.2d 470 (1977) (applying "same class-
relatedness" rule, and holding that checking account overdrafts were not related to primary
inventory financing and thus were not secured under all obligations clause in original security
agreement with bank).
261. See, e.g., In re Midas Coin Co., 264 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mo. 1967), affidper curiam
sub nom. Zuke v. St. Johns Community Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968); In re Sunshine
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curity of an agreement containing an all obligations clause extended to
the debtor's obligation to pay for the creditor's services as stock transfer
agent 262 should also be followed under the Code.
Debtor as Surety
Sometimes the owner of the collateral is not the principal debtor to
whom the creditor extends secured value, but a surety.263 When the se-
curity agreement contains an all obligations clause, and the value of the
collateral belonging to the surety exceeds the outstanding debt, the credi-
tor may regard the security interest as an insurance policy. Fortified
against risk, the creditor may make otherwise ill-advised loans to the
debtor for new and possibly risky projects, sometimes regardless of the
debtor's financial weakness. 264 Concluding that the creditor's making of
objectively unreasonable future advances in reliance upon the surety's
collateral is in most cases unjustifiable, especially in light of the surety's
good Samaritan accommodation status, courts have historically held
that the clause assertedly covering the surety's obligation is to be con-
strued strictissimijuris, i.e., of the strictest law.265 Strictly construing the
Books, Ltd., 41 Bankr. 712 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Zwicker, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 924 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1971); National Bank v. Shaad, 60 A.D.2d 774, 400 N.Y.S.2d
965 (1977); Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dentsply Professional Plan, 617 P.2d 1340
(Okla. 1980); South County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Bituminous Pavers Co., 106 R.I. 178, 256
A.2d 514 (1969); Odom v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Justice, supra note 2, at 896-915.
262. Kenneally v. Standard Elecs. Corp., 364 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1966) (Minnesota law).
263. See U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (defining "debtor" to include owner of collateral who does
not owe the payment or performance of the obligation secured).
264. Functionally the same situation can arise when the collateral is jointly owned and
subject to a security instrument containing a joint and several all obligations clause. For exam-
ple, in First v. Byrne, 238 Iowa 712, 28 N.W.2d 509 (1947), discussed in 2 G. GILMORE, supra
note 2, § 35.2, at 918-19, the parties were joint owners of real property subject to a mortgage
containing a joint and several all obligations clause. The court rejected an attempt by the
mortgagee to impress a lien upon the property to secure a previously unsecured individual debt
of First, contracted long before the mortgage. Such joint ownership problems are rare in
purely commercial security arrangements under Article Nine.
265. L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 94-100 (1915); A. STEARNS,
THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP § 1.2, at 2; § 2.4, at 11-12; § 5.1, at 89-90 (5th ed. 1951); Alces, The
Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial Transactions, 61 N.C.L. REv. 655,
660 (1983) ("[T]he enactment of statutory law and the evolution of common law have betrayed
a discernible deference to any party that becomes obligated to answer for the debt of an-
other."); cf. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 88 (1941) ("The contract of a surety is interpreted
according to the standards that govern the interpretation of contracts in general."); id. com-
ment b, Special Note ("Where there is a special standard of interpretation requiring contracts
to be interpreted strictly in favor of one party or the other, such rule is frequently referred to as
the rule of strictissimijuris.").
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surety's contract often results in a holding that the security did not ex-
tend to the creditor's future advances to the principal debtor.
When under Article Nine2 66 a surety has put up her collateral as an
accommodation to the principal debtor under a substantially adhesive
security agreement with a professional lender containing an all obliga-
tions clause, the surety's security agreement should be strictly construed
in accordance with the standards traditionally applied in surety arrange-
ments. In such a case, the "same class-relatedness" rule may be treated
as a formulation of suretyship's strictissimijuris rule of construction,
267
and may appropriately be applied as a principle supplementing the
Code.
268
Secured Creditor Advances Made to "Squeeze Out"
an Intervening Lien Creditor
In 1972, the drafters of the Code added section 9-301(4), which pro-
vides absolute priority for advances made by a perfected secured creditor
over an intervening judicial lien for forty-five days after the lien attaches,
and which also extends the priority for advances made without knowl-
edge of the rival lien more than forty-five days after its attachment.
269
The principal purpose of section 9-301(4) was to conform state law to the
requirements of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966270 so that commercial
secured creditors could have priority for certain future advances over the
266. The relationship between corporate contract bond surety law and Article Nine is
complex and beyond the scope of this Article. In general, the professional contract bond
surety in construction contracts has subrogation rights which are outside Article Nine. Na-
tional Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969). The
relationship between other claims of the professional surety and Article Nine is not so clear.
See generally Whitney, Rubin & Stabbe, Twenty Years of the Uniform Commercial Code and
Fidelity and Surety Bonding-Some Random Observations, 18 FORUM 670 (1983); Wisner,
Improving the Surety's Secured Position Under an Indemnity Agreement, 40 INS. COUNS. J. 564
(1973).
267. See Kitmitto v. First Pa. Bank, 518 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania
would probably apply relatedness rule to determine scope of surety's agreement containing all
obligations clause; surety issues not discussed as such); see also Reeves v. Habersham Bank,
254 Ga. 615, 331 S.E.2d 589 (1985) (antecedent debt of principal debtor to bank secured by
operation of all obligations clause in surety's security agreement with bank); Estate of Beyer v.
Bank of Pa., 449 Pa. 24, 295 A.2d 280 (1972) (court treated six-year course of dealing between
bank and surety as evidence that surety's security agreement containing all obligations clause
intended to secure future obligations of principal debtor to bank).
268. U.C.C. § 1-103 (principles of law and equity supplement the Code).
269. Id. § 9-301(4). The person with a lien on specific property acquired through judicial
process is a "lien creditor." Id. § 9-301(3). An "intervening" judicial lien is one which at-
taches to collateral after the security interest has been perfected but before the secured creditor
has made future advances.
270. Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (1982)).
See generally W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS (3d ed. 1972).
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federal government's filed tax lien.
271
Explaining the adoption of section 9-301(4), the drafters stated:
It seems unfair to make it possible for a debtor and secured party with
knowledge of the judgment lien to squeeze out a judgment creditor
who has successfully levied on a valuable equity subject to a security
interest by permitting later enlargement of the security interest by an
additional [optional] advance .... 272
The drafters' statement seems to be more of a critique than a justifi-
cation for section 9-301(4). It should be unnecessary to adjust priority
rules as a means of regulating secured creditors because the courts have
other means of redressing actions taken by secured creditors and debtors
for the purpose of harming third-party creditors. If a secured creditor
makes a future advance deliberately to "squeeze out" the intervening ju-
dicial lienor, the court should find that the advance was made in bad
faith, beyond community standards of fairness and commercial reasona-
bleness, and should refuse to accord it priority over intervening liens,
notwithstanding section 9-301(4). Alternatively, the court may find that
a security interest deliberately extended under a future advance clause in
order to "squeeze out" a lien creditor should be voided as a fraudulent
conveyance.273 On the other hand, if the secured creditor makes future
advances within the forty-five day period allowed by section 9-301(4),
even with knowledge of the intervening judgment lien, for the purpose of
saving the debtor from financial collapse or preserving the value of collat-
eral, the court should find that such advances were made in good faith
and not fraudulently, and should enforce them as secured obligations en-
titled to priority under section 9-301(4).
Debtor's Performance Obligations
Although the Code and commentators have spent much effort on
classifying the types of collateral, they have not worried much about the
taxonomy of secured obligations, perhaps because results so rarely turn
on characterizations in this area. The Code recognizes two types of se-
271. U.C.C. § 9-301 comment 7; id. § 9-312, Official Reasons for 1972 Change (5), re-
printed in 3 U.L.A. 536 (1981).
272. U.C.C. § 9-312, Official Reasons for 1972 Change (5), reprinted in 3 U.L.A. 536
(1981).
273. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1978); UNIF. FRAUD-
ULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1984); see Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent
Conveyances, 97 HARV L. REV. 495, 506 (1983) ("[T]he focus on motives [of the transferee]
fully comports with the purpose and language of the [Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance] act
[requiring that the transferee take in good faith].").
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cured obligations: payment obligations and performance obligations.2 74
A payment obligation is a debtor's obligation to pay money to the credi-
tor. The obligation may be to repay the creditor for advances, which in
that case may be called "advance obligations." Alternatively, the pay-
ment obligation may be to reimburse the creditors for administrative,
collection, legal, or other expenditures made in connection with the se-
curity arrangement. Such reimbursement obligations may be called
"nonadvance obligations."2 75
A debtor's performance obligation is an obligation to do something
other than simply to pay money to the creditor, or an obligation to re-
frain from acting in a particular way.2 7 6 Most commercial security
agreements will impose many performance obligations on the debtor inci-
dental to the security arrangement itself. For example, the debtor may
agree to maintain the collateral, to insure it, to keep it in one location, to
keep it free of encumbrances, and not to sell it. Breach of such incidental
performance obligations is typically an event of default authorizing accel-
eration of the debt and foreclosure of the security interest, but the
debtor's breach usually does not otherwise entitle the creditor to
damages.
We are concerned here with what might be called the debtor's "in-
dependent" or "nonincidental" secured contractual performance obliga-
tions, 2 77 that is, those obligations to do or not do something independent
of, and not merely incidental to, the security arrangement itself. For
example, a debtor may agree not to compete with the creditor, or to sup-
ply all the creditor's requirements for particular goods or services, or to
274. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (" 'Security interest' means an interest . . . which secures pay-
ment or performance of an obligation.").
275. The Second Circuit distinguished "nonadvance" from "advance" obligations in Dick
Warner Cargo Handling Corp. v. Aetna Business Credit, 746 F.2d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1984)
("We will call the debtor's obligations to pay interest and to indemnify the lender for various
expenses incurred by him obligations for 'non-advances.' ").
276. Obviously, one could say that the obligation to pay money is simply a special type of
performance obligation, but that would vitiate a useful distinction. In addition, the debtor's
breach of some performance obligations may be redressed by money damages, the payment of
which is secured. However, in that case the secured creditor's original right is to the perform-
ance, and the payment obligation which follows from a breach is merely remedial. A perform-
ance obligation is a form of "nonadvance" obligation.
277. In addition to voluntarily assumed contractual performance obligations, each debtor
will have general tort duties running to the creditor. Such duties may be considered a form of
performance obligation and may be claimed to be secured under an all obligations clause.
However, no case has been found in which a secured creditor even claimed that a debtor's
liability to pay damages for violation of a general tort duty was secured. In the absence of
highly special circumstances, an all obligations clause should not be held to extend the security
to cover tortious conduct which is not a breach of the debtor's contractual obligations, or
which does not arise out of the parties' course of dealing.
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warrant that goods sold to the creditor will be of a certain quality, or to
purchase all its requirements from the creditor or otherwise deal exclu-
sively with the creditor. The debtor's performance of any such independ-
ent obligation may be secured either as a primary
278 or secondary279
obligation.
A secured creditor's claim that a debtor's independent performance
obligation is secured under an all obligations clause in a security agree-
ment raises difficult interpretive and regulatory problems. Application of
the "same class-relatedness" rule will almost always result in a holding
that an independent performance obligation is unsecured, since such an
obligation will always be of a different class than a primary payment obli-
gation. The better approach, as with other secondary obligations, is to
determine the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties as to the
scope of the security agreement, and to hold the creditor to his obligation
of good faith.
In John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State Bank,280 a financing
buyer, John Miller Supply Co., lent a seller, Willow Creek Manufactur-
ing, $5000 as partial financing for the manufacture of grain storage
bins.281 Willow Creek signed a security agreement giving John Miller a
security interest in certain collateral to secure the original loan and all
other liabilities of Willow Creek to John Miller. Subsequently, John
Miller and Willow Creek further agreed that John Miller would be the
exclusive distributor of the bins. 282 Willow Creek later acquired more
financing from Western State Bank, which took a subordinate security
interest in the same collateral as that covered by the John Miller security
interest.
After the grain storage bin project failed, Western State Bank fore-
closed its security interest in the collateral. John Miller then brought an
action against the bank, asserting its priority interest in the proceeds.
John Miller claimed that its interest secured not only repayment of the
$5000 loan, but also Willow Creek's performance of its sales and exclu-
sive distribution contracts with John Miller.28 3 John Miller alleged that
Willow Creek had breached these contracts and that these breaches had
caused it $63,000 in damages. John Miller further claimed that Willow
278. "Primary secured obligation" is defined supra note 3.
279. "Secondary secured obligation" is defined supra note 4. Since a performance obliga-
tion is a "nonadvance" obligation, it would never be secured under a future advance clause, no
matter how broad.
280. 55 Wis. 2d 385, 199 N.W.2d 161 (1972).
281. Id. at 388, 199 N.W.2d at 162.
282. Id. at 387-88, 199 N.W.2d at 161-62.
283. Id. at 389, 199 N.W.2d at 162.
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Creek's obligation to pay these damages was secured by its security inter-
est in Willow Creek's collateral.
284
The Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly concluded that the control-
ling version of Article Nine permits the securing of performance obliga-
tions,2 85 but it failed to cite the two sections (9-201286 and 9-204(3)287)
which directly supported its conclusion. Instead, the court cited section
9-204(5),288 which authorizes the securing of future advances and other
value,2 89 and which is marginally relevant at best since Willow Creek's
allegedly secured warranty and exclusive dealing obligations were obliga-
tions to perform, not to repay advances or other value extended by John
Miller.
The court defined the principal issue to be the intent of John Miller
and Willow Creek as to the scope of their security agreement.290 Apply-
ing the "same class-relatedness" rule of construction, the court found
that Willow Creek's executory performance obligations were in a differ-
ent class from the primary repayment obligation, and that the secondary
performance obligations were not related to the primary obligation. 291
The court concluded that the parties did not intend to include Willow
Creek's performance obligations among those secured under the
agreement.
292
The grounds upon which the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided
John Miller are shaky at best. As applied in the case, the "same class-
relatedness" test amounts to a rule of law that a secondary performance
obligation can never be secured under an all obligations clause in a secur-
ity agreement in which the debtor's primary obligation is to repay value
extended by the creditor. The secondary performance obligation will al-
ways be of a different class than the primary repayment obligation.
However, as we have seen, there is no justification in the Code for such a
restrictive rule of law.29
3
284. Id.
285. Id. at 391-92, 199 N.W.2d at 164 (citing the 1962 version of the U.C.C.).
286. U.C.C. § 9-201 (security agreement is effective according to its terms).
287. Id. § 9-204(3) (security agreement may provide that collateral shall secure all obliga-
tions covered by the security agreement).
288. John Miller, 55 Wis. 2d at 393, 199 N.W.2d at 164.
289. U.C.C. § 9-204(5) (1962) (obligations covered by a security agreement may include
future advances or other value).
290. John Miller, 55 Wis. 2d at 390, 199 N.W.2d at 163.
291. Id. at 393-94, 199 N.W.2d at 164-65.
292. Id.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53. Part of the court's finding under the
"same class-relatedness" test is also doubtful. Although a performance obligation is plainly of
a different class than a repayment obligation, under the facts of John Miller it appears, con-
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A better approach in John Miller would have been for the court
initially to have determined the objectively reasonable expectations of
John Miller and Willow Creek as to the scope of their relationship. It is
reasonable to infer that the parties expected their relationship to be com-
prehensive, and that they expected both primary repayment and secon-
dary performance obligations to be secured. It is not unreasonable for a
financing buyer to take security for the debtor-seller's performance obli-
gations as well as for that party's repayment of advances.
But whatever the parties' initial expectations, John Miller, as se-
cured creditor, was obligated to enforce its security agreement in good
faith. Although the case report does not contain enough facts to make a
definitive determination, John Miller's claim reeks of bad faith. The
companies may have been so closely connected that Willow Creek was
virtually a captive of John Miller. If that were the situation, John Miller
would bear substantial responsibility for Willow Creek's defaults, and
should not be allowed to take collateral from Western State Bank to
compensate for its own failures. Moreover, it would be helpful to know
when and to what extent John Miller asserted its breach of contract
claims against Willow Creek. If John Miller waited until Willow Creek
finally collapsed before vigorously asserting its contract claims, the delay
would be strong evidence that John Miller was acting in bad faith in
asserting that its contract claims were secured.
Creditor Assignees
Creditors can be assignees of security agreements or of previously
unsecured obligations of the debtor. Both situations can present difficult
interpretive and regulatory problems.
Previously Unsecured Creditor as Assignee of Debtor's Security Agreement
The Code clearly permits the assignment of a security agreement,
294
and such assignments are routinely made in retail installment and other
trary to the court's finding, 55 Wis. 2d at 394, 199 N.W.2d at 165, that Willow Creek's obliga-
tions to deliver merchantable bins and to comply with the exclusive distributorship provision
were closely related to Willow Creek's obligation to repay the financing buyer's loan. Of
course, if it had found that Willow Creek's performance obligations were related to its repay-
ment obligations, then the court would have had to analyze the relationship between the "same
class" and "relatedness" components of the test.
294. U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (clause in security agreement waiving as against assignee debtor's
claims or defenses against seller or lessor enforceable by certain assignees of security agree-
ment); id. § 9-302(2) ("If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest, no filing under
this Article is required in order to continue the perfected status of the security interest .... ");
id. § 9-302 comment 7 (example of permitted assignment); id. § 9-405 (recording assignment
of security interest and financing statement).
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financing. Occasionally, a debtor's previously unsecured creditors will
take an assignment of the debtor's security agreement, and assert that the
previously unsecured debts become secured under the agreement's all ob-
ligations clause.295 Professor Gilmore regarded such claims by secured
creditors as abuses justifying the strict "same class-relatedness" rule.
296
A debtor's previously unsecured secondary obligation is never of the
same class as the primary obligation under the security agreement, and
can, under the rule, easily be held to be unsecured.
The "same class-relatedness" rule, however, is not necessary to find
that an all obligations clause in an assigned agreement does not extend
the security to the debtor's previously unsecured debts. In the absence of
highly special circumstances, the debtor and original secured party could
not reasonably expect that the clause was a license for the secured credi-
tor's assignee unilaterally to convert the debtor's previously unsecured
debts into secured obligations. Nothing in existing commercial practice
or the Code's system of secured credit affords creditor assignees such
power. Correlatively, a creditor assignee who asserts that a debtor's pre-
viously unsecured obligation is secured under an'all obligations clause
would appear to be overreaching, acting in bad faith.297 Taking the as-
signment may be an attempt on the part of the assignee to recapture the
opportunity to secure the originally unsecured debt, an opportunity de-
liberately foregone when the debt was originally contracted.298
Secured Creditor's Acquisition of Debtor's Previously Unsecured Debts
A secured creditor may acquire the debtor's previously unsecured
obligation owed to a third party and claim that the acquired obligation
has become secured under the security agreement's all obligations
clause.299 The leading case of this type is Gillet v. Bank of America,3°° a
295. E.g., Exparte Chandler, 477 So. 2d 360 (Ala. 1985) (all obligations clause in security
agreement taken by assignment does not secure debtor's pre-assignment debt to assignee); cf
Thorp Sales Corp. v. Dolese Bros. Co., 453 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (all obligations
clause in security agreement taken by assignment does not secure debtor's separate third-party
debt also taken by assignment).
296. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 2, § 35.2, at 917-18.
297. See generally Muris, supra note 108.
298. See generally Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369 (1980).
299. This is likewise a claim thought by Professor Gilmore to be illegitimate. 2 G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 2, § 35.2, at 918.
300. 160 N.Y. 549, 55 N.E. 292 (1899); see also Thorp Sales Corp. v. Dolese Bros. Co., 453
F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (all obligations clause in security agreement taken by assign-
ment did not secure debtor's separate third-party debt also taken by assignment); In re Tiffany
Lingerie, Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 96, 208 N.Y.S.2d 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (pre-Code case; all
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pre-Code case discussed above in detail.30 1 In Gillet, the court held that
an all obligations clause in a printed-form stock pledge agreement did not
operate to secure the debtor's previously unsecured note which the se-
cured creditor had acquired by assignment after the debtor's default.
In such cases under the Code, the courts should ascertain, as did the
court in Gillet,30 2 the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties as
to the scope of their debtor-creditor relationship, and should also ensure
that the secured creditor is acting in good faith in claiming that the
purchased obligation is secured. Probably in most cases of this nature,
the securing of the acquired unsecured obligation will be both beyond the
objectively reasonable expectations of the parties and a claim made in
bad faith.
Still, no per se rule of invalidity should be applied in these cases.
There may be circumstances in which it would not be unreasonable for a
secured creditor to purchase an outstanding third-party obligation and
add it to those obligations secured under an all obligations clause. If the
agreement has a future advance or all obligations clause, the secured
creditor could simply advance funds directly to the debtor to pay off the
third-party debt. Then repayment of the advance would be secured. At
least when there is the express or tacit agreement of the debtor, and op-
pressive results do not otherwise occur, the secured creditor should be
able to advance funds directly to the third-party creditor by purchasing
the obligation for fair value, and thus secure his obligation.
Post-Assignment Advances Made to Debtor by Assignee of Security Agreement
Occasionally, the assignee of a security agreement makes an advance
to the debtor after the assignment, and then asserts that repayment of the
advance is secured under the agreement's future advance or all obliga-
tions clause. At least two courts have concluded, without informed dis-
cussion, that such advances are secured under Article Nine.30 3 However,
post-assignment advances can easily present problems of interpretation
and regulation similar to those raised by claims that other obligations are
secured under a broad future advance or all obligations clause. Such
cases thus deserve close examination to determine the reasonable expec-
tations and bona fides of all parties.
obligations clause in factoring agreement did not allow assignee of accounts receivable to apply
receipts to previously unsecured third-party debts of assignor acquired by purchase).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 174-83.
302. 160 N.Y. at 556, 55 N.E. at 294.
303. In re Southwest Pa. Natural Resources, Inc., 11 Bankr. 900 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981);
Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Maxwell, 557 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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Conclusion
Article Nine worked a revolution in liberating the law of secured
credit from the restrictions of the past, in democratizing it so that virtu-
ally all financers and small businesses could easily, cheaply, and safely
engage in secured transactions, and in creating a system of priorities
which overwhelmingly favors secured creditors against rival claimants to
the debtor's collateral. Although the drafters did not clearly state their
purposes in the Comments to the Code, the main purpose of Article Nine
was to encourage the extension of credit on a secured basis toward the
ultimate end of promoting economic growth.
The new system grounds the debtor-secured creditor relationship
largely in contract law. The parties are given substantial freedom to
shape their relationship in their original security agreement, which, if it
meets minimal formalities, is made effective between them and against
third parties. As a corollary to the general freedom of debtor-creditor
contract created by Article Nine, an agreement enables the parties to
secure all secondary obligations of the debtor to the creditor, including,
among others, the debtor's obligation to perform contractual duties other
than to pay money.
The Code's comprehensive validation of future advance and all obli-
gations clauses in security agreements has created difficult interpretive
and regulatory problems. Many commercial security agreements con-
taining broad future advance or all obligations clauses are both rela-
tional, in that they establish a continuing debtor-creditor relationship,
and adhesive, in that they are on printed forms supplied by the creditor
which are merely adhered to by the debtor. Under these circumstances,
the parties' intent to include a particular secondary obligation of the
debtor among those secured under the original agreement is ascertained
by determining the objectively reasonable expectations of the parties as to
the scope of their continuing debtor-creditor relationship. In addition,
secured creditor overreaching and other abusive behavior is both de-
terred and redressed by requiring creditors to act in good faith, that is, in
accordance with community standards of commercial reasonableness and
fair dealing.
The allowable scope of a security agreement containing a future ad-
vance or all obligations clause should not be determined by applying the
"same class-relatedness" rule of construction. This rule states that to be
secured under a future advance or all obligations clause, the secondary
obligation must be of the same class as the primary obligation and so
related to it that the debtor's consent to its inclusion as a secured obliga-
tion may be inferred. The rule is inappropriate under Article Nine for
July 1986]
1074 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37
several reasons. It is without determinate content, as neither "class" nor
"relatedness" is defined. Courts are unclear as to whether the rule is
merely an aid to interpretation or a rule of strict construction which op-
erates as a rule of law. As a restrictive rule of law, the "same class-
relatedness" test is wholly unjustified under the Code, since it restricts
Article Nine's validation of future advance and all obligations clauses,
frustrating the Code's purpose to reduce transaction costs and secured
creditor risks. Finally, although the restrictive "same class-relatedness"
rule is alleged to have been part of the general pre-Code law, an examina-
tion of pre-Code law suggests that it was a minority rule of limited appli-
cation, and that most jurisdictions, whatever their verbal formulations,
applied tests of commercially reasonable expectations and good faith ap-
propriate to the time and circumstance.
